# Appendix for "Conflict and Cooperation with Trade Partners"

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### Appendix A. CAMEO scale

In this section, we reproduce the list of CAMEO scale used in the ICEWS data, which is available from https://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/28075/MA6YJK&version=3.0.

Table A.1: CAMEO scale

CAMEO code	Scale	Event	
01	0.0	MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT	
010	0.0	Make statement, not specified below	
011	-0.1	Decline comment	
012	-0.4	Make pessimistic comment	
013	0.4	Make optimistic comment	
014	0.0	Consider policy option	
015	0.0	Acknowledge or claim responsibility	
016	3.4	Make empathetic comment	
017	0.0	Engage in symbolic act	
018	3.4	Express accord	
02	3.0	APPEAL	
020	3.0	Appeal, not specified below	
021	3.4	Appeal for cooperation, not specified below	
0211	3.4	Appeal for diplomatic cooperation	
0212	3.4	Appeal for material cooperation	
022	3.4	Appeal for policy support	
023	3.4	Appeal for aid, not specified below	
0231	3.4	Appeal for economic aid	
		Con	tinued on next page

Table A.1 – continued from previous page

CAMEO code	Scale	Event
0232	3.4	Appeal for military aid
0233	3.4	Appeal for humanitarian aid
0234	3.4	Appeal for military protection or peacekeeping
024	-0.3	Appeal for political reform, not specified below
0241	-0.3	Appeal for change in leadership
0242	-0.3	Appeal for policy change
0243	-0.3	Appeal for rights
0244	-0.3	Appeal for change in institutions, regime
025	-0.3	Appeal to yield
026	4.0	Appeal to others to meet or negotiate
027	4.0	Appeal to others to settle dispute
028	4.0	Appeal to others to engage in mediation
03	4.0	EXPRESS INTENT TO COOPERATE
030	4.0	Express intent to cooperate, not specified below
031	5.2	Express intent to engage in material cooperation, not specified below
0311	5.2	Express intent to cooperate economically
0312	5.2	Express intent to cooperate militarily
032	4.5	Express intent to provide policy support
033	5.2	Express intent to provide aid, not specified below
0331	5.2	Express intent to provide economic aid
0332	5.2	Express intent to provide military aid
0333	5.2	Express intent to provide humanitarian aid
0334	6.0	Express intent to provide military protection or peacekeeping
034	7.0	Express intent to bring political reform, not specified below
		Continued on next page

Table A.1 – continued from previous page

CAMEO code	Scale	Event
0341	7.0	Express intent to change leadership
0342	7.0	Express intent to change policy
0343	7.0	Express intent to provide rights
0344	7.0	Express intent to change institutions, regime
035	7.0	Express intent to yield, not specified below
0351	7.0	Express intent to ease administrative sanctions
0352	7.0	Express intent to stop protests
0353	7.0	Express intent to accede to political demands
0354	7.0	Express intent to release persons or property
0355	7.0	Express intent to ease economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo
0356	7.0	Express intent allow international involvement (not mediation)
0357	7.0	Express intent to de-escalate military engagement
036	4.0	Express intent to meet or negotiate
037	5.0	Express intent to settle dispute
038	7.0	Express intent to accept mediation
039	5.0	Express intent to mediate
04	1.0	CONSULT
040	1.0	Consult, not specified below
041	1.0	Discuss by telephone
042	1.9	Make a visit
043	2.8	Host a visit
044	2.5	Meet at a "third" location
045	5.0	Mediate
046	7.0	Engage in negotiation
		Continued on next page

Table A.1 – continued from previous page

CAMEO code	Scale	Event
05	3.5	ENGAGE IN DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION
050	3.5	Engage in diplomatic cooperation, not specified below
051	3.4	Praise or endorse
052	3.5	Defend verbally
053	3.8	Rally support on behalf of
054	6.0	Grant diplomatic recognition
055	7.0	Apologize
056	7.0	Forgive
057	8.0	Sign formal agreement
06	6.0	ENGAGE IN MATERIAL COOPERATION
060	6.0	Engage in material cooperation, not spec below
061	6.4	Cooperate economically
062	7.4	Cooperate militarily
063	7.4	Engage in judicial cooperation
064	7.0	Share intelligence or information
07	7.0	PROVIDE AID
070	7.0	Provide aid, not specified below
071	7.4	Provide economic aid
072	8.3	Provide military aid
073	7.4	Provide humanitarian aid
074	8.5	Provide military protection or peacekeeping
075	7.0	Grant asylum
08	5.0	YIELD
080	5.0	Yield, not specified below
		Continued on next page

Table A.1 – continued from previous page

CAMEO code	Scale	Event
081	5.0	Ease administrative sanctions, not specified below
0811	5.0	Ease restrictions on freedoms of speech and expression
0812	5.0	Ease ban on political parties or politicians
0813	5.0	Ease curfew
0814	5.0	Ease state of emergency or martial law
082	5.0	Ease popular protest
083	5.0	Accede to demands for political reform
0831	5.0	Accede to demands for change in leadership
0832	5.0	Accede to demands for change in policy
0833	5.0	Accede to demands for rights
0834	5.0	Accede to demands for change in institutions, regime
084	7.0	Return, release, not specified below
0841	7.0	Return, release person(s)
0842	7.0	Return, release property
085	7.0	Ease economic sanctions, boycott, embargo
086	9.0	Allow international involvement
0861	9.0	Receive deployment of peacekeepers
0862	9.0	Receive inspectors
0863	9.0	Allow delivery of humanitarian aid
087	9.0	De-escalate military engagement
0871	9.0	Declare truce, ceasefire
0872	9.0	Ease military blockade
0873	9.0	Demobilize armed forces
0874	10.0	Retreat or surrender militarily
		Continued on next page

Table A.1 – continued from previous page

CAMEO code	Scale	Event
09	-2.0	INVESTIGATE
090	-2.0	Investigate, not specified below
091	-2.0	Investigate crime, corruption
092	-2.0	Investigate human rights abuses
093	-2.0	Investigate military action
094	-2.0	Investigate war crimes
10	-5.0	DEMAND
100	-5.0	Demand, not specified below
101	-5.0	Demand information, investigation
102	-5.0	Demand policy support
103	-5.0	Demand aid, protection, or peacekeeping
104	-5.0	Demand political reform, not specified below
1041	-5.0	Demand change in leadership
1042	-5.0	Demand policy change
1043	-5.0	Demand rights
1044	-5.0	Demand change in institutions, regime
105	-5.0	Demand mediation
106	-5.0	Demand withdrawal
107	-5.0	Demand ceasefire
108	-5.0	Demand meeting, negotiation
11	-2.0	DISAPPROVE
110	-2.0	Disapprove, not specified below
111	-2.0	Criticize or denounce
112	-2.0	Accuse, not specified below
		Continued on next page

Table A.1 – continued from previous page

CAMEO code	Scale	Event
1121	-2.0	Accuse of crime, corruption
1122	-2.0	Accuse of human rights abuses
1123	-2.0	Accuse of aggression
1124	-2.0	Accuse of war crimes
1125	-2.0	Accuse of espionage, treason
113	-2.0	Rally opposition against
114	-2.0	Complain officially
115	-2.0	Bring lawsuit against
12	-4.0	REJECT
120	-4.0	Reject, not specified below
121	-4.0	Reject proposal, not specified below
1211	-4.0	Reject ceasefire, withdrawal
1212	-4.0	Reject peacekeeping
1213	-4.0	Reject settlement
122	-4.0	Reject request for material aid
123	-4.0	Reject demands for political reform
1231	-4.0	Reject demands for change in leadership
1232	-4.0	Reject demands for policy change
1233	-4.0	Reject demand for rights
1234	-4.0	Reject demand change in institutions, regime
124	-5.0	Reject proposal to meet, discuss, or negotiate
125	-5.0	Reject mediation
126	-5.0	Defy norms, law
127	-5.0	Reject accusation, deny responsibility
		Continued on next page

Table A.1 – continued from previous page

CAMEO code	Scale	Event
128	-5.0	Veto
13	-6.0	THREATEN
130	-4.4	Threaten, not specified below
131	-5.8	Threaten non-force, not specified below
1311	-5.8	Threaten to reduce or stop aid
1312	-5.8	Threaten to boycott, embargo, or sanction
1313	-5.8	Threaten to reduce or break relations
132	-5.8	Threaten with administrative sanctions, not specified below
1321	-5.8	Threaten to impose restrictions on freedoms of speech and expression
1322	-5.8	Threaten to ban political parties or politicians
1323	-5.8	Threaten to impose curfew
1324	-5.8	Threaten to impose state of emergency or martial law
133	-5.8	Threaten collective dissent
134	-5.8	Threaten to halt negotiations
135	-5.8	Threaten to halt mediation
136	-7.0	Threaten to expel or withdraw peacekeepers
137	-7.0	Threaten with violent repression
138	-7.0	Threaten to use military force, not specified below
1381	-7.0	Threaten blockade
1382	-7.0	Threaten occupation
1383	-7.0	Threaten unconventional violence
1384	-7.0	Threaten conventional attack
1385	-7.0	Threaten attack with WMD
139	-7.0	Give ultimatum
		Continued on next page

Table A.1 – continued from previous page

CAMEO code	Scale	Event
14	-6.5	PROTEST
140	-6.5	Engage in popular protest, not specified below
141	-6.5	Demonstrate or rally
1411	-6.5	Demonstrate for change in leadership
1412	-6.5	Demonstrate for policy change
1413	-6.5	Demonstrate for rights
1414	-6.5	Demonstrate for change in institutions, regime
142	-6.5	Conduct hunger strike, not specified below
1421	-6.5	Conduct hunger strike for change in leadership
1422	-6.5	Conduct hunger strike for policy change
1423	-6.5	Conduct hunger strike for rights
1424	-6.5	Conduct hunger strike for change in institutions, regime
143	-6.5	Conduct strike or boycott, not specified below
1431	-6.5	Conduct strike or boycott for change in leadership
1432	-6.5	Conduct strike or boycott for policy change
1433	-6.5	Conduct strike or boycott for rights
1434	-6.5	Conduct strike or boycott for change in institutions, regime
144	-7.5	Obstruct passage, block
1441	-7.5	Obstruct passage to demand change in leadership
1442	-7.5	Obstruct passage to demand policy change
1443	-7.5	Obstruct passage to demand rights
1444	-7.5	Obstruct passage to demand change in institutions, regime
145	-7.5	Protest violently, riot
1451	-7.5	Obstruct passage to demand change in leadership
		Continued on next page

Table A.1 – continued from previous page

CAMEO code	Scale	Event
1452	-7.5	Obstruct passage to demand policy change
1453	-7.5	Obstruct passage to demand rights
1454	-7.5	Obstruct passage to demand change in institutions, regime
15	-7.2	EXHIBIT FORCE POSTURE
150	-7.2	Demonstrate military or police power, not specified below
151	-7.2	Increase police alert status
152	-7.2	Increase military alert status
153	-7.2	Mobilize or increase police power
154	-7.2	Mobilize or increase armed forces
16	-4.0	REDUCE RELATIONS
160	-4.0	Reduce relations, not specified below
161	-4.0	Reduce or break diplomatic relations
162	-5.6	Reduce or stop aid, not specified below
1621	-5.6	Reduce or stop economic assistance
1622	-5.6	Reduce or stop military assistance
1623	-5.6	Reduce or stop humanitarian assistance
163	-6.5	Halt negotiations
164	-7.0	Expel or withdraw, not specified below
1641	-7.0	Expel or withdraw peacekeepers
1642	-7.0	Expel or withdraw inspectors, observers
1643	-7.0	Expel or withdraw aid agencies
165	-7.0	Halt mediation
166	-8.0	Impose embargo, boycott, or sanctions
17	-7.0	COERCE
		Continued on next page

Table A.1 – continued from previous page

CAMEO code	Scale	Event
170	-7.0	Coerce, not specified below
171	-9.2	Seize or damage property, not specified below
1711	-9.2	Confiscate property
1712	-9.2	Destroy property
172	-5.0	Impose administrative sanctions, not specified below
1721	-5.0	Impose restrictions on freedoms of speech and expression
1722	-5.0	Ban political parties or politicians
1723	-5.0	Impose curfew
1724	-5.0	Impose state of emergency or martial law
173	-5.0	Arrest, detain, or charge with legal action
174	-5.0	Expel or deport individuals
175	-9.0	Use violent repression
18	-9.0	ASSAULT
180	-9.0	Use unconventional violence, not specified below
181	-9.0	Abduct, hijack, or take hostage
182	-9.5	Physically assault, not specified below
1821	-9.0	Sexually assault
1822	-9.0	Torture
1823	-10.0	Kill by physical assault
183	-10.0	Conduct suicide, car, or other non-military bombing, not spec below
1831	-10.0	Carry out suicide bombing
1832	-10.0	Carry out car bombing
1833	-10.0	Carry out roadside bombing
184	-8.0	Use as human shield
		Continued on next page

Table A.1 – continued from previous page

CAMEO code	Scale	Event
185	-8.0	Attempt to assassinate
186	-10.0	Assassinate
19	-10.0	FIGHT
190	-10.0	Use conventional military force, not specified below
191	-9.5	Impose blockade, restrict movement
192	-9.5	Occupy territory
193	-10.0	Fight with small arms and light weapons
194	-10.0	Fight with artillery and tanks
195	-10.0	Employ aerial weapons
196	-9.5	Violate ceasefire
20	-10.0	ENGAGE IN UNCONVENTIONAL MASS VIOLENCE
200	-10.0	Engage in unconventional mass violence, not specified below
201	-9.5	Engage in mass expulsion
202	-10.0	Engage in mass killings
203	-10.0	Engage in ethnic cleansing
204	-10.0	Use weapons of mass destruction, not specified below
2041	-10.0	Use chemical, biological, or radiological weapons
2042	-10.0	Detonate nuclear weapons

#### Appendix B. Primary model

In this section, we present the coefficient table, coefficient plot, and prediction plot for our primary model. These are the same models presented in the main paper, which serve as a baseline for the subsequent models presented here. As noted in the research design, we specify two directed-dyad year equations to estimate initiation of cooperative and conflictual events. In each equation, our DVs are coded for the year t+1, while we include explanatory variables for both event types in year t; that is, we control for lagged events.

Table A.2: OLS coefficients and 95 percent confidence bounds for lagged events model, 1995-2012

	Dependent Variables	
	Cooperation	Conflict
Coop Level	0.47*** (0.46, 0.47)	0.05*** (0.05, 0.05)
Conf Level	0.20*** (0.19, 0.20)	0.43*** (0.43, 0.44)
KOF 1	0.33*** (0.26, 0.39)	-0.02 (-0.05, 0.01)
KOF 2	0.33*** (0.27, 0.39)	-0.02 (-0.05, 0.01)
Mutual Major Trade Partners	0.94*** (0.90, 0.99)	0.43*** (0.40, 0.45)
1 Is Major Partner of 2	0.62*** (0.59, 0.65)	0.05*** (0.04, 0.06)
2 Is Major Partner of 1	0.64*** (0.61, 0.66)	0.05*** (0.04, 0.07)
Trade/GDP 1	-0.001 (-0.004, 0.003)	0.01*** (0.01, 0.01)
Trade/GDP 2	-0.0005 (-0.004, 0.003)	0.01*** (0.01, 0.01)
Trade Balance	0.0002 (-0.001, 0.002)	-0.0000 (-0.001, 0.001)
CINC Ratio	0.003 (-0.01, 0.01)	-0.01 (-0.01, -0.001)
log Distance	$-0.27^{***}$ (-0.28, -0.27)	0.004 (0.001, 0.01)
log Population 1	0.02*** (0.01, 0.03)	0.0002 (-0.005, 0.01)
log Population 2	0.02*** (0.01, 0.03)	$-0.01^{**}$ (-0.02, -0.01)
log GDP 1	0.18*** (0.17, 0.19)	0.03*** (0.02, 0.03)
log GDP 2	0.18*** (0.17, 0.19)	0.02*** (0.02, 0.03)
Democracy 1	$-0.17^{***}$ (-0.19, -0.15)	0.03*** (0.02, 0.04)
Democracy 2	-0.18***(-0.20, -0.16)	0.01 (0.002, 0.02)
Alliance	0.22*** (0.19, 0.24)	0.09*** (0.08, 0.10)
Contiguity	$-0.31^{***}$ (-0.36, -0.25)	0.23*** (0.20, 0.25)
KOF 1:Mutual Major Trade Partners	-1.50***(-1.73, -1.26)	-1.21*** (-1.32, -1.10)
KOF 1:1 Is Major Partner of 2	$-0.62^{***}$ (-0.77, -0.46)	$-0.34^{***}$ (-0.41, -0.27)
KOF 1:2 Is Major Partner of 1	-1.08***(-1.22, -0.94)	$-0.17^{**} (-0.23, -0.10)$
KOF 2:Mutual Major Trade Partners	-1.46***(-1.69, -1.23)	-1.38*** (-1.49, -1.27)
KOF 2:1 Is Major Partner of 2	-1.06***(-1.20, -0.91)	-0.26***(-0.33, -0.19)
KOF 2:2 Is Major Partner of 1	$-0.66^{***}$ (-0.81, -0.51)	$-0.42^{***}$ (-0.49, -0.35)
Trade/GDP 1:Trade/GDP 2	$-0.01^{***}$ (-0.01, -0.01)	0.005*** (0.004, 0.01)
Democracy 1:Democracy 2	$0.20^{***}$ (0.17, 0.23)	$-0.06^{***}$ (-0.07, -0.05)
Constant	-8.18*** (-8.35, -8.01)	-3.50*** (-3.58, -3.42)
Observations	321544	321544
$R^2$	0.532	0.32
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.532	0.32

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01




Figure A.1: Coefficients and 95% confidence bounds from primary SUR model




Figure A.2: Marginal effects of major trade partner status over the 25%-75% range of global economic exposure, with 95% confidence intervals, from our primary SUR model




Figure A.3: Predicted levels of cooperation and conflict, with 95% confidence intervals, over the 25%-75% range of global economic exposure, from our primary SUR model




Figure A.4: Predicted levels of cooperation and conflict from Model 1, with 95% confidence intervals, over the 25%-75% range of global economic exposure

#### Appendix C. Lagged events model for relative and total events

In this section, we present results for models in which we re-specify the main dependent variables as relative cooperation to conflict and total events (cooperation plus conflict). Given that similar information can be derived from our main models (though with additional postestimation), it is unsurprising that these models return equivalent results.

Table A.3: OLS coefficients and 95 percent confidence bounds for relative/total model, 1995-2012

	Dependen	t Variables
	Relative	Total
Coop Level	0.42*** (0.41, 0.42)	0.46*** (0.46, 0.47)
Conf Level	-0.24***(-0.24, -0.23)	0.23*** (0.22, 0.24)
KOF 1	0.34*** (0.28, 0.41)	0.32*** (0.26, 0.38)
KOF 2	0.35*** (0.29, 0.42)	0.32*** (0.26, 0.38)
Mutual Major Trade Partners	0.52*** (0.47, 0.57)	0.92*** (0.87, 0.97)
1 Is Major Partner of 2	0.57*** (0.54, 0.60)	0.62*** (0.60, 0.65)
2 Is Major Partner of 1	0.58*** (0.55, 0.61)	0.65*** (0.62, 0.68)
Trade/GDP 1	$-0.01^{***}$ (-0.01, -0.01)	-0.001 (-0.004, 0.003)
Trade/GDP 2	$-0.01^{***}$ (-0.01, -0.01)	0.001 (-0.003, 0.004)
Trade Balance	0.0002 (-0.001, 0.002)	0.0003 (-0.001, 0.002)
CINC Ratio	0.01 (-0.002, 0.02)	-0.0002 (-0.01, 0.01)
log Distance	-0.28***(-0.29, -0.27)	-0.28***(-0.29, -0.27)
log Population 1	0.02*** (0.01, 0.03)	0.02*** (0.01, 0.03)
log Population 2	0.03*** (0.02, 0.04)	0.02*** (0.01, 0.03)
log GDP PC 1	0.15*** (0.14, 0.16)	0.18*** (0.17, 0.19)
log GDP PC 2	0.16*** (0.15, 0.17)	0.19*** (0.18, 0.20)
Democracy 1	-0.20***(-0.22, -0.18)	$-0.16^{***}$ (-0.18, -0.14
Democracy 2	-0.19***(-0.22, -0.17)	-0.18*** (-0.20, -0.16
Alliance	0.13*** (0.10, 0.15)	0.23*** (0.20, 0.25)
Contiguity	$-0.53^{***}$ (-0.59, -0.48)	-0.31*** (-0.37, -0.26
KOF 1:Mutual Major Trade Partners	-0.29**(-0.53, -0.04)	-1.36*** (-1.60, -1.13
KOF 1:1 Is Major Partner of 2	$-0.27^{***}$ (-0.43, -0.11)	$-0.64^{***}$ (-0.79, -0.49
KOF 1:2 Is Major Partner of 1	$-0.91^{***}$ (-1.06, -0.76)	-1.03*** (-1.17, -0.88
KOF 2:Mutual Major Trade Partners	-0.08 (-0.33, 0.17)	-1.34*** (-1.57, -1.10
KOF 2:1 Is Major Partner of 2	$-0.80^{***}$ (-0.95, -0.64)	-1.02*** (-1.16, -0.87
KOF 2:2 Is Major Partner of 1	-0.24*** (-0.39, -0.08)	-0.71*** (-0.86, -0.56
Trade/GDP 1:Trade/GDP 2	$-0.01^{***}$ (-0.01, -0.01)	$-0.01^{***}$ (-0.01, -0.01
Democracy 1:Democracy 2	0.26*** (0.23, 0.29)	0.19*** (0.16, 0.22)
Constant	-4.68*** (-4.86, -4.50)	-8.24*** (-8.41, -8.07
Observations	321544	321544
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.398	0.536
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.398	0.536

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01




Figure A.5: Coefficients and 95% confidence bounds, from relative/total model




Figure A.6: Predicted levels of cooperation and conflict, with 95% confidence intervals, over the 25%-75% range of global economic exposure, from relative/total model

## Appendix D. SUR model

In this section, we present the results for an alternative SUR model in which we omit the variables for lagged events and instead include year fixed effects. Substantive results look quite similar in these models, though confidence bounds for marginal effects and predicted values tend to be tighter.

Table A.4: SUR coefficients and 95 percent confidence bounds for lagged events model, 1995-2012

	Dependen	ıt Variables
	Cooperation	Conflict
Coop Level	0.47*** (0.46, 0.47)	0.05*** (0.05, 0.05)
Conf Level	0.20*** (0.19, 0.20)	0.43*** (0.43, 0.44)
KOF 1	0.33*** (0.26, 0.39)	-0.02 (-0.05, 0.01)
KOF 2	0.33*** (0.27, 0.39)	-0.02 (-0.05, 0.01)
Mutual Major Trade Partners	0.94*** (0.90, 0.99)	0.43*** (0.40, 0.45)
1 Is Major Partner of 2	0.62*** (0.59, 0.65)	0.05*** (0.04, 0.06)
2 Is Major Partner of 1	0.64*** (0.61, 0.66)	0.05*** (0.04, 0.07)
Trade/GDP 1	-0.001 (-0.004, 0.003)	$0.01^{***}$ (0.01, 0.01)
Trade/GDP 2	-0.0005 (-0.004, 0.003)	0.01*** (0.01, 0.01)
Trade Balance	0.0002 (-0.001, 0.002)	-0.0000 (-0.001, 0.001)
CINC Ratio	0.003 (-0.01, 0.01)	-0.01 (-0.01, -0.001)
log Distance	$-0.27^{***}$ (-0.28, -0.27)	0.004 (0.001, 0.01)
log Population 1	0.02*** (0.01, 0.03)	0.0002 (-0.005, 0.01)
log Population 2	0.02*** (0.01, 0.03)	-0.01**(-0.02, -0.01)
log GDP 1	0.18*** (0.17, 0.19)	0.03*** (0.02, 0.03)
log GDP 2	0.18*** (0.17, 0.19)	0.02*** (0.02, 0.03)
Democracy 1	$-0.17^{***}$ (-0.19, -0.15)	0.03*** (0.02, 0.04)
Democracy 2	$-0.18^{***}$ (-0.20, -0.16)	0.01 (0.002, 0.02)
Alliance	$0.22^{***}$ (0.19, 0.24)	0.09*** (0.08, 0.10)
Contiguity	$-0.31^{***}$ (-0.36, -0.25)	0.23*** (0.20, 0.25)
KOF 1:Mutual Major Trade Partners	$-1.50^{***}$ (-1.73, -1.26)	-1.21*** (-1.32, -1.10)
KOF 1:1 Is Major Partner of 2	$-0.62^{***}$ (-0.77, -0.46)	$-0.34^{***}$ (-0.41, -0.27)
KOF 1:2 Is Major Partner of 1	-1.08***(-1.22, -0.94)	$-0.17^{**}$ (-0.23, -0.10)
KOF 2:Mutual Major Trade Partners	-1.46***(-1.69, -1.23)	-1.38*** (-1.49, -1.27)
KOF 2:1 Is Major Partner of 2	-1.06***(-1.20, -0.91)	$-0.26^{***}$ (-0.33, -0.19)
KOF 2:2 Is Major Partner of 1	-0.66***(-0.81, -0.51)	$-0.42^{***}$ (-0.49, -0.35)
Trade/GDP 1:Trade/GDP 2	$-0.01^{***}$ (-0.01, -0.01)	0.005*** (0.004, 0.01)
Democracy 1:Democracy 2	0.20*** (0.17, 0.23)	$-0.06^{***}$ (-0.07, -0.05)
Constant	-8.18*** (-8.35, -8.01)	-3.50*** (-3.58, -3.42)
Observations	321544	321544
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.532	0.32
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.532	0.32

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01




Figure A.7: Marginal effects and 95% confidence bounds from Model 1




Figure A.8: Predicted levels of cooperation and conflict, with 95% confidence intervals, over the 25%-75% range of global economic exposure, from directed dyad-year model with year fixed effects

### Appendix E. Year fixed effects model

In this section, we present the results for an alternative SUR model in which we omit the variables for lagged events and instead include year fixed effects. Substantive results look quite similar in these models, though confidence bounds for marginal effects and predicted values tend to be tighter.

Table A.5: OLS coefficients and 95 percent confidence bounds for model with year fixed effects, 1995-2012

	Dependent Variables	
	Cooperation	Conflict
KOF 1	0.60*** (0.53, 0.67)	-0.01 (-0.05, 0.02)
KOF 2	$0.60^{***}$ (0.53, 0.67)	-0.02 (-0.06, 0.01)
Mutual Major Trade Partners	2.15*** (2.10, 2.21)	0.93*** (0.91, 0.96)
1 Is Major Partner of 2	1.21*** (1.18, 1.24)	$0.18^{***}$ (0.17, 0.20)
2 Is Major Partner of 1	1.23*** (1.20, 1.27)	$0.19^{***}$ (0.17, 0.20)
Trade/GDP 1	0.01*** (0.002, 0.01)	$0.02^{***}$ (0.01, 0.02)
Trade/GDP 2	0.01*** (0.002, 0.01)	0.02*** (0.02, 0.02)
Trade Balance	0.0002 (-0.001, 0.002)	0.0001 (-0.001, 0.001)
CINC Ratio	0.002 (-0.01, 0.01)	-0.01 (-0.02, -0.004)
log Distance	-0.52***(-0.53, -0.51)	-0.04*** (-0.04, -0.03
log Population 1	0.03*** (0.01, 0.04)	-0.0003(-0.01, 0.01)
log Population 2	0.03*** (0.02, 0.04)	-0.02*** (-0.02, -0.01)
log GDP PC 1	0.36*** (0.35, 0.37)	0.07*** (0.07, 0.08)
log GDP PC 2	0.36*** (0.35, 0.37)	0.07*** (0.06, 0.08)
Democracy 1	$-0.32^{***}$ (-0.35, -0.30)	$0.02^{**}$ (0.01, 0.04)
Democracy 2	$-0.35^{***}$ (-0.38, -0.33)	-0.01 (-0.02, 0.004)
Year:1996	0.04 (-0.02, 0.10)	0.03 (-0.002, 0.05)
Year:1997	0.23*** (0.17, 0.29)	0.07** (0.04, 0.10)
Year:1998	0.38*** (0.32, 0.44)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.11)
Year:1999	0.53*** (0.47, 0.58)	0.11*** (0.08, 0.14)
Year:2000	0.63*** (0.58, 0.69)	0.14*** (0.11, 0.16)
Year:2001	0.67*** (0.62, 0.73)	0.16*** (0.13, 0.18)
Year:2002	0.66*** (0.60, 0.71)	0.17*** (0.14, 0.20)
Year:2003	0.65*** (0.60, 0.70)	0.16*** (0.14, 0.19)
Year:2004	0.69*** (0.63, 0.74)	0.18*** (0.16, 0.21)
Year:2005	0.72*** (0.66, 0.77)	0.19*** (0.16, 0.22)
Year:2006	0.64*** (0.59, 0.70)	0.18*** (0.15, 0.21)
Year:2007	0.52*** (0.47, 0.58)	0.16*** (0.14, 0.19)
Year:2008	0.36*** (0.31, 0.42)	0.15**** (0.12, 0.17)
Year:2009	0.36*** (0.31, 0.42)	0.13*** (0.10, 0.15)
Year:2010	0.18*** (0.12, 0.23)	0.13*** (0.10, 0.15)
Year:2011	0.21*** (0.16, 0.27)	0.09*** (0.07, 0.12)
Year:2012	0.21*** (0.15, 0.26)	0.11*** (0.08, 0.13)
Alliance	0.47*** (0.44, 0.50)	0.19*** (0.18, 0.21)
Contiguity	$-0.42^{***}$ (-0.47, -0.36)	0.36*** (0.33, 0.39)
KOF 1:Mutual Major Trade Partners	$-3.44^{***}$ (-3.71, -3.18)	-2.35*** (-2.47, -2.22)
KOF 1:1 Is Major Partner of 2	-1.19*** (-1.36, -1.02)	$-0.65^{***}$ (-0.73, -0.57)
KOF 1:2 Is Major Partner of 1	$-2.10^{***}$ (-2.27, -1.94)	$-0.47^{***}$ (-0.55, -0.39)
KOF 2:Mutual Major Trade Partners	$-3.38^{***}$ (-3.64, -3.11)	-2.52*** (-2.65, -2.40
KOF 2:1 Is Major Partner of 2	$-2.04^{***}$ (-2.20, -1.87)	$-0.55^{***}$ (-0.62, -0.47)
KOF 2:2 Is Major Partner of 1	$-1.27^{***}$ (-1.44, -1.10)	$-0.80^{***}$ (-0.88, -0.72)
Trade/GDP 1:Trade/GDP 2	$-0.01^{***}$ (-0.01, -0.01)	0.01*** (0.01, 0.01)
Democracy 1:Democracy 2	0.36*** (0.33, 0.39)	$-0.07^{***}$ (-0.09, -0.06)
Constant	-18.52*** (-18.71, -18.34)	-0.07 (-0.09, -0.06 -7.71*** (-7.80, -7.62
Observations P <sup>2</sup>	321544	321544
$R^2$	0.391	0.138
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.391	0.138
Note:	*p·	<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.03
	1 20	-




Figure A.9: Coefficients and 95% confidence bounds, from directed dyad-year model with year fixed effects




Figure A.10: Predicted levels of cooperation and conflict, with 95% confidence intervals, over the 25%-75% range of global economic exposure, from directed dyad-year model with year fixed effects

## Appendix F. KOF yearly average model

In this section, we present the results for an alternative model in which we omit the variables for lagged events and instead include yearly average of KOF. Substantive results look quite similar to the yearly fixed effects model.

Table A.6: OLS coefficients and 95 percent confidence bounds for model with KOF yearly average, 1995-2012

	Dependent Variables	
	Cooperation	Conflict
KOF 1	0.62*** (0.55, 0.70)	-0.01 (-0.04, 0.02)
KOF 2	0.62*** (0.55, 0.69)	-0.02 (-0.05, 0.01)
Mutual Major Trade Partners	2.16*** (2.11, 2.21)	0.93*** (0.91, 0.96)
1 Is Major Partner of 2	1.22*** (1.18, 1.25)	0.19*** (0.17, 0.20)
2 Is Major Partner of 1	1.24*** (1.21, 1.27)	0.19*** (0.17, 0.20)
Trade/GDP 1	0.005** (0.0003, 0.01)	$0.02^{***}$ (0.01, 0.02)
Trade/GDP 2	$0.01^{**}$ (0.001, 0.01)	0.02*** (0.02, 0.02)
Trade Balance	0.0002 (-0.001, 0.002)	0.0001 (-0.001, 0.001)
CINC Ratio	0.002 (-0.01, 0.01)	-0.01 (-0.02, -0.004)
log Distance	-0.52***(-0.53, -0.51)	-0.04***(-0.04, -0.03)
log Population 1	0.03*** (0.02, 0.05)	0.0005 (-0.01, 0.01)
log Population 2	0.04*** (0.02, 0.05)	-0.02** (-0.02, -0.01)
log GDP PC 1	0.35*** (0.34, 0.36)	0.07*** (0.07, 0.08)
log GDP PC 2	0.35*** (0.34, 0.37)	0.07*** (0.06, 0.07)
Democracy 1	-0.32***(-0.34, -0.29)	0.02** (0.01, 0.04)
Democracy 2	-0.35***(-0.37, -0.32)	$-0.01 \; (-0.02, 0.004)$
KOF yearly average	1.79*** (1.50, 2.09)	1.06*** (0.92, 1.19)
Alliance	0.48*** (0.45, 0.51)	$0.19^{***}$ (0.18, 0.21)
Contiguity	$-0.42^{***}$ (-0.48, -0.36)	0.36*** (0.33, 0.39)
KOF 1:Mutual Major Trade Partners	-3.40***(-3.67, -3.14)	-2.34***(-2.47, -2.22)
KOF 1:1 Is Major Partner of 2	-1.18***(-1.35, -1.01)	-0.65***(-0.73, -0.57)
KOF 1:2 Is Major Partner of 1	-2.09***(-2.25, -1.92)	-0.47*** (-0.54, -0.39)
KOF 2:Mutual Major Trade Partners	-3.33***(-3.60, -3.07)	-2.52***(-2.64, -2.39)
KOF 2:1 Is Major Partner of 2	-2.02***(-2.18, -1.86)	-0.54***(-0.62, -0.47)
KOF 2:2 Is Major Partner of 1	-1.26***(-1.43, -1.09)	$-0.80^{***}$ (-0.88, -0.72)
Trade/GDP 1:Trade/GDP 2	-0.01***(-0.01, -0.01)	$0.01^{***}$ (0.01, 0.01)
Democracy 1:Democracy 2	0.36*** (0.33, 0.39)	$-0.07^{***}$ (-0.09, -0.06)
Constant	-17.88*** (-18.06, -17.70)	-7.55*** (-7.63, -7.46)
Observations	321544	321544
$R^2$	0.386	0.137
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.386	0.137

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01




Figure A.11: Coefficients and 95% confidence bounds, from directed dyad-year model with year fixed effects




Figure A.12: Predicted levels of cooperation and conflict, with 95% confidence intervals, over the 25%-75% range of global economic exposure, from directed dyad-year model with year fixed effects

### Appendix G. Lagged events model with three-way interaction

In this section, we re-specify our primary model with one key change: we include an interaction between initiator and target KOF index, which, given that each state's KOF index is interacted with major trade partner status, necessitates the use of a three-way interaction. Though coefficients suggest mixed results for this more complicated interactive specification, substantive results look quite similar to our main model.

Table A.7: OLS coefficients and 95 percent confidence bounds for lagged events model with three-way interaction, 1995-2012

	Danandani	Variables		
	Dependent Variables Cooperation Conflict			
Coop Level	0.46*** (0.46, 0.47)	0.05*** (0.05, 0.05)		
Coop Level	0.20*** (0.19, 0.20)	0.03 (0.03, 0.03)		
KOF 1		-0.02 (-0.05, 0.01)		
KOF 2	$0.32^{***}$ (0.26, 0.38) $-0.02$ (-0.05, 0. $0.33^{***}$ (0.27, 0.39) $-0.02$ (-0.05, 0.			
Mutual Major Trade Partners	1.00*** (0.95, 1.04)	0.42*** (0.40, 0.45)		
1 Is Major Partner of 2	0.63*** (0.60, 0.65)	0.42 (0.40, 0.43)		
2 Is Major Partner of 1	0.64*** (0.61, 0.67)	0.05**** (0.04, 0.06)		
Trade/GDP 1	-0.002 (-0.01, 0.002)	0.03 (0.04, 0.00) 0.01*** (0.01, 0.01)		
Trade/GDP 2	-0.002 (-0.01, 0.002) -0.002 (-0.01, 0.002)	$0.01^{***} (0.01, 0.01)$ $0.01^{***} (0.01, 0.01)$		
Trade Balance	0.002(-0.01, 0.002) 0.0001(-0.001, 0.002)	-0.0000 (-0.001, 0.001)		
	0.0001 (-0.001, 0.002) 0.003 (-0.01, 0.01)			
CINC Ratio	, , ,	-0.01 (-0.01, -0.001)		
log Distance	$-0.28^{***}$ (-0.28, -0.27)	0.004 (0.001, 0.01)		
log Population 1	0.02*** (0.01, 0.03)	0.0002 (-0.005, 0.01)		
log Population 2	0.02*** (0.01, 0.03)	$-0.01^{**}$ (-0.02, -0.01)		
log GDP PC 1	0.18*** (0.17, 0.19)	0.03*** (0.02, 0.03)		
log GDP PC 2	0.18*** (0.17, 0.19)	0.02*** (0.02, 0.03)		
Democracy 1	$-0.17^{***}$ (-0.19, -0.15)	0.03*** (0.02, 0.04)		
Democracy 2	$-0.18^{***}$ (-0.20, -0.16)	0.01 (0.002, 0.02)		
Alliance	0.22*** (0.19, 0.24)	0.09*** (0.08, 0.10)		
Contiguity	$-0.29^{***} (-0.34, -0.24)$	0.23*** (0.20, 0.25)		
KOF 1:KOF2	1.06*** (0.77, 1.36) -0.08 (-0.21, 0			
KOF 1:Mutual Major Trade Partners	$-1.49^{***}$ (-1.72, -1.25) $-1.21^{***}$ (-1.32, -			
KOF 1:1 Is Major Partner of 2	$-0.61^{***}$ (-0.76, -0.46) $-0.34^{***}$ (-0.41, -			
KOF 1:2 Is Major Partner of 1	-1.09*** (-1.23, -0.95)	$-0.16^{**}$ (-0.23, -0.10)		
KOF 2:Mutual Major Trade Partners	-1.45*** (-1.68, -1.21)	-1.38*** (-1.49, -1.27)		
KOF 2:1 Is Major Partner of 2	$-1.07^{***}$ (-1.21, -0.93)	-0.26*** (-0.33, -0.19)		
KOF 2:2 Is Major Partner of 1	$-0.66^{***}$ (-0.81, -0.51)	$-0.42^{***}$ (-0.49, -0.35)		
Trade/GDP 1:Trade/GDP 2	$-0.01^{***}$ (-0.01, -0.004)	0.005*** (0.004, 0.01)		
Democracy 1:Democracy 2	$0.20^{***}$ (0.17, 0.23)	$-0.06^{***}$ (-0.07, -0.05)		
KOF 1:KOF2:Mutual Major Trade Partners	$-8.76^{***}$ (-10.06, -7.46)	0.38 (-0.23, 0.99)		
KOF 1:KOF2:1 Is Major Partner of 2	-2.13**** (-2.97, -1.30)	0.33 (-0.07, 0.72)		
KOF 1:KOF2:2 Is Major Partner of 1	$-1.82^{***}$ (-2.65, -0.98)	0.36 (-0.04, 0.75)		
Constant	-8.18*** (-8.35, -8.01)	-3.50*** (-3.58, -3.42)		
Observations	321544	321544		
$R^2$	0.533	0.32		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.533	0.32		
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			




Figure A.13: Coefficients and 95% confidence bounds, from three-way interaction model




Figure A.14: Predicted levels of cooperation and conflict, with 95% confidence intervals, over the 25%-75% range of global economic exposure, from three-way interaction model

# Appendix H. Lagged DV model without economic dependence variables

As we note in the main text, our operationalization of major trade partner status is distinct from the typical operation of trade/GDP—i.e., "trade dependence." As such, the main models include an interaction for initiator dependence on trade with the target X target dependence on trade with the initiator. However, given the possibility that our variables are capturing the same information, we re-specified our main model without these controls. Results are consistent with those presented in the main text.

Table A.8: OLS coefficients and 95 percent confidence bounds for lagged events, omitted dependence model, 1995-2012

	Dependent Variables		
	Cooperation	Conflict	
Coop Level	0.47*** (0.46, 0.47)	0.05*** (0.05, 0.05)	
Conf Level	0.19*** (0.19, 0.20)	0.44*** (0.43, 0.44)	
KOF 1	0.32*** (0.26, 0.38)	-0.02 (-0.05, 0.01)	
KOF 2	0.32*** (0.26, 0.39)	$-0.03 \; (-0.05,  0.003)$	
Mutual Major Trade Partners	0.89*** (0.85, 0.94)	0.50*** (0.48, 0.52)	
1 Is Major Partner of 2	0.62*** (0.59, 0.65)	0.06*** (0.05, 0.07)	
2 Is Major Partner of 1	0.64*** (0.61, 0.67)	0.06*** (0.05, 0.08)	
Trade Balance	0.0001 (-0.001, 0.002)	-0.0000 ( $-0.001$ , $0.001$ )	
CINC Ratio	0.003 (-0.01, 0.01)	-0.01 (-0.01, -0.001)	
log Distance	-0.27***(-0.28, -0.26)	0.001 (-0.002, 0.005)	
log Population 1	0.19*** (0.18, 0.21)	0.03*** (0.02, 0.03)	
log Population 2	0.20*** (0.19, 0.22)	$0.01^* \ (0.01, 0.02)$	
log GDP PC 1	0.18*** (0.17, 0.19)	0.03*** (0.02, 0.03)	
log GDP PC 2	0.18*** (0.17, 0.19)	0.02*** (0.02, 0.03)	
Democracy 1	-0.17*** (-0.19, -0.15)	0.03*** (0.02, 0.04)	
Democracy 2	-0.19***(-0.21, -0.16)	0.01 (0.004, 0.02)	
Alliance	0.22*** (0.19, 0.25)	0.09*** (0.08, 0.10)	
Contiguity	$-0.31^{***}$ (-0.36, -0.26)	0.24*** (0.21, 0.26)	
KOF 1:Mutual Major Trade Partners	-1.69***(-1.92, -1.46)	-1.03***(-1.14, -0.92)	
KOF 1:1 Is Major Partner of 2	-0.62***(-0.77, -0.47)	-0.29***(-0.36, -0.22)	
KOF 1:2 Is Major Partner of 1	-1.08***(-1.23, -0.94)	-0.17** (-0.24, -0.10)	
KOF 2:Mutual Major Trade Partners	-1.65***(-1.88, -1.42)	-1.19*** (-1.30, -1.08)	
KOF 2:1 Is Major Partner of 2	-1.06***(-1.20, -0.92)	-0.27*** (-0.33, -0.20)	
KOF 2:2 Is Major Partner of 1	$-0.67^{***}$ (-0.82, -0.52)	$-0.37^{***}$ (-0.44, -0.30)	
Democracy 1:Democracy 2	0.20*** (0.17, 0.23)	-0.06*** (-0.07, -0.05)	
Constant	-8.18*** (-8.36, -8.01)	-3.50*** (-3.58, -3.42	
Observations	321998	321998	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.532	0.319	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.532	0.319	

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01




Figure A.15: Coefficients and 95% confidence bounds from lagged events, omitted dependence model




Figure A.16: Predicted levels of cooperation and conflict, with 95% confidence intervals, over the 25%-75% range of global economic exposure, from lagged events, omitted dependence model




Figure A.17: Predicted levels of cooperation and conflict, with 95% confidence intervals, over the 25%-75% range of global economic exposure, from year FE, omitted dependence model

# Appendix I. Lagged DV Model replacing KOF with number of major trade partners (both)

In this section, we rerun the analysis replacing KOF with the number of major trade partners (both imports and exports). The results are very different from the primary model's.

Table A.9: OLS coefficients and 95 percent confidence bounds for lagged events model, 1995-2012

	Dependent Variables		
	Cooperation	Conflict	
Coop Level	0.46*** (0.46, 0.46)	$0.05^{***}$ (0.05, 0.05)	
Conf Level	0.20*** (0.19, 0.20)	0.44*** (0.43, 0.44)	
Major Partners Count 1	0.04*** (0.03, 0.05)	-0.03***(-0.03, -0.02)	
Major Partners Count 2	0.06*** (0.05, 0.07)	-0.01** (-0.02, -0.01)	
Mutual Major Trade Partners	0.47*** (0.34, 0.61)	-0.06 (-0.12, 0.01)	
1 Is Major Partner of 2	-0.27***(-0.35, -0.19)	-0.19*** (-0.23, -0.15)	
2 Is Major Partner of 1	0.27*** (0.17, 0.36)	-0.23***(-0.28, -0.19)	
Trade/GDP 1	0.0005 (-0.001, 0.002)	0.0004 (-0.001, 0.001)	
Trade/GDP 2	0.001 (-0.001, 0.003)	0.002** (0.001, 0.003)	
Trade Balance	0.002*** (0.0005, 0.003)	$-0.001 \; (-0.001, 0.0001)$	
CINC Ratio	0.003 (-0.01, 0.01)	-0.005 (-0.01, 0.0003)	
log Distance	-0.28***(-0.29, -0.27)	-0.003 (-0.01, 0.0005)	
log Population 1	0.02*** (0.01, 0.02)	0.01** (0.01, 0.02)	
log Population 2	0.03*** (0.02, 0.04)	0.003 (-0.001, 0.01)	
log GDP 1	0.16*** (0.15, 0.17)	0.02*** (0.01, 0.02)	
log GDP 2	0.14*** (0.13, 0.15)	0.01** (0.01, 0.02)	
Democracy 1	$-0.17^{***}$ (-0.19, -0.15)	0.04*** (0.03, 0.05)	
Democracy 2	-0.20***(-0.22, -0.17)	$0.02^* \ (0.01, 0.03)$	
Alliance	0.22*** (0.19, 0.24)	0.08*** (0.07, 0.09)	
Contiguity	-0.25***(-0.30, -0.20)	0.26*** (0.24, 0.28)	
Major Partners Count 1:Mutual Major Trade Partners	0.10*** (0.04, 0.15)	0.04 (0.01, 0.06)	
Major Partners Count 1:1 Is Major Partner of 2	0.26*** (0.23, 0.29)	0.02 (0.002, 0.03)	
Major Partners Count 1:2 Is Major Partner of 1	0.11*** (0.07, 0.15)	0.12*** (0.10, 0.13)	
Major Partners Count 2:Mutual Major Trade Partners	0.09*** (0.06, 0.12)	0.18*** (0.17, 0.19)	
Major Partners Count 2:1 Is Major Partner of 2	0.14*** (0.12, 0.16)	0.09*** (0.08, 0.10)	
Major Partners Count 2:2 Is Major Partner of 1	0.30*** (0.27, 0.33)	0.07*** (0.06, 0.08)	
Trade/GDP 1:Trade/GDP 2	$-0.01^{***}$ (-0.01, -0.01)	0.002** (0.001, 0.002)	
Democracy 1:Democracy 2	0.16*** (0.13, 0.19)	-0.08***(-0.10, -0.07)	
Constant	$-6.90^{***}$ (-7.10, -6.71)	-3.29*** (-3.38, -3.20)	
Observations	324486	324486	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.532	0.318	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.532	0.318	

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01




Figure A.18: Coefficients and 95% confidence bounds from lagged events, original KOF scale model  $\,$ 




Figure A.19: Predicted levels of cooperation and conflict, with 95% confidence intervals, over the 25%-75% range of global economic exposure, from year FE, omitted dependence model

# Appendix J. Lagged DV model replacing KOF with economic dependence

In this section, we rerun the analysis replacing KOF with Trade/GDP. The results are very different from the primary model's.

Table A.10: OLS coefficients and 95 percent confidence bounds for lagged events model, 1995-2012

	Dependent Variables			
	Cooperation	Conflict		
Coop Level	0.47*** (0.46, 0.47)	0.05*** (0.05, 0.05)		
Conf Level	0.21*** (0.20, 0.21)	$0.44^{***}$ (0.44, 0.44)		
Trade/GDP 1	0.28*** (0.22, 0.34)	-0.06** (-0.09, -0.04)		
Trade/GDP 2	0.28*** (0.22, 0.34)	$-0.07^{***}$ (-0.10, -0.05)		
Mutual Major Trade Partners	1.09*** (1.04, 1.15)	0.33*** (0.30, 0.35)		
1 Is Major Partner of 2	0.65*** (0.62, 0.69)	0.05*** (0.03, 0.06)		
2 Is Major Partner of 1	0.67*** (0.64, 0.71)	0.05*** (0.04, 0.07)		
Trade Balance	0.0001 (-0.001, 0.001)	$-0.0000 \; (-0.001,  0.001)$		
CINC Ratio	0.003 (-0.01, 0.01)	-0.01 (-0.01, -0.0004)		
log Distance	-0.26***(-0.27, -0.26)	0.004 (0.001, 0.01)		
log Population 1	0.01*** (0.004, 0.02)	0.01**(0.01, 0.01)		
log Population 2	0.02*** (0.01, 0.03)	0.001 (-0.003, 0.01)		
log GDP 1	0.17*** (0.16, 0.18)	0.02*** (0.02, 0.02)		
log GDP 2	0.18*** (0.17, 0.18)	$0.02^{***}$ (0.01, 0.02)		
Democracy 1	-0.17*** (-0.19, -0.15)	0.04*** (0.03, 0.05)		
Democracy 2	-0.18*** (-0.20, -0.16)	0.02** (0.01, 0.03)		
Alliance	0.18*** (0.16, 0.21)	0.10*** (0.09, 0.11)		
Contiguity	$-0.30^{***}$ (-0.35, -0.25)	0.24*** (0.22, 0.27)		
Trade/GDP 1:Mutual Major Trade Partners	$-0.31^{***}$ (-0.37, -0.25)	0.08*** (0.06, 0.11)		
Trade/GDP 1:1 Is Major Partner of 2	-0.28***(-0.34, -0.22)	0.07** (0.04, 0.09)		
Trade/GDP 1:2 Is Major Partner of 1	$-0.08 \; (-0.20,  0.04)$	0.07 (0.01, 0.13)		
Trade/GDP 2:Mutual Major Trade Partners	-0.31***(-0.37, -0.25)	0.09***(0.07, 0.12)		
Trade/GDP 2:1 Is Major Partner of 2	-0.05 (-0.17, 0.07)	0.09 (0.03, 0.14)		
Trade/GDP 2:2 Is Major Partner of 1	-0.28***(-0.34, -0.22)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.10)		
Democracy 1:Democracy 2	0.17*** (0.14, 0.20)	-0.08***(-0.09, -0.07)		
Constant	-7.84*** (-8.01, -7.67)	-3.49*** (-3.57, -3.41)		
Observations	324486	324486		
$R^2$	0.53	0.316		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.53	0.316		

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01




Figure A.20: Coefficients and 95% confidence bounds from lagged events, original KOF scale model  $\,$ 




Figure A.21: Predicted levels of cooperation and conflict, with 95% confidence intervals, over the 25%-75% range of global economic exposure, from year FE, omitted dependence model

### Appendix K. Lagged DV Model with target's events

In this section, we rerun the analysis controlling for the other states' conflict and cooperation initiation. The results remain similar with the primary model's with the exception of cooperation when only a state itself is a MTP.

Table A.11: OLS coefficients and 95 percent confidence bounds for lagged events model, 1995-2012

	Dependent Variables			
	Cooperation	Conflict		
Coop Level 1	0.25*** (0.24, 0.26)	0.02*** (0.02, 0.03)		
Conf Level 1	0.12*** (0.11, 0.13)	0.33*** (0.33, 0.34)		
Coop Level 2	0.16*** (0.15, 0.17)	0.01*** (0.01, 0.02)		
Conf Level 2	0.10*** (0.09, 0.12)	0.21*** (0.21, 0.22)		
KOF 1	0.55*** (0.39, 0.71)	-0.04 (-0.13, 0.04)		
KOF 2	0.61*** (0.45, 0.77)	-0.05 (-0.14, 0.03)		
Mutual Major Trade Partners	0.69*** (0.61, 0.77)	0.19*** (0.15, 0.23)		
1 Is Major Partner of 2	0.72*** (0.66, 0.77)	0.02(-0.01, 0.05)		
2 Is Major Partner of 1	0.75*** (0.69, 0.80)	0.03 (-0.003, 0.05)		
Trade/GDP 1	-0.01 (-0.02, 0.01)	0.03*** (0.02, 0.04)		
Trade/GDP 2	-0.004 (-0.02, 0.01)	0.03*** (0.03, 0.04)		
Trade Balance	-0.0004 (-0.004, 0.003)	0.0003 (-0.002, 0.002)		
CINC Ratio	0.02 (-0.01, 0.05) -0.02 (-0.04, -			
log Distance	-0.33***(-0.34, -0.32)	-0.01 (-0.02, -0.004)		
log Population 1	0.05*** (0.02, 0.07)	0.02 (0.01, 0.03)		
log Population 2	0.07*** (0.04, 0.10)	-0.02 (-0.04, -0.01)		
log GDP 1	0.26*** (0.23, 0.29)	0.06*** (0.04, 0.07)		
log GDP 2	0.28*** (0.26, 0.31)	0.05*** (0.03, 0.06)		
Democracy 1	-0.23***(-0.28, -0.17)	0.11*** (0.09, 0.14)		
Democracy 2	$-0.31^{***}$ (-0.36, -0.25) $0.05^*$ (0.02, 0.08)			
Alliance	0.27*** (0.23, 0.32)			
Contiguity	$-0.57^{***}$ (-0.66, -0.47) $0.17^{***}$ (0.13, 0.22)			
KOF 1:Mutual Major Trade Partners	-1.50***(-1.87, -1.14)	$-0.95^{***}$ (-1.14, -0.76)		
KOF 1:1 Is Major Partner of 2	-0.37***(-0.64, -0.09)	-0.30**(-0.44, -0.15)		
KOF 1:2 Is Major Partner of 1	-1.27***(-1.54, -0.99)	-0.06 (-0.20, 0.09)		
KOF 2:Mutual Major Trade Partners	-1.52***(-1.89, -1.16)	$-1.21^{***}$ (-1.40, -1.02)		
KOF 2:1 Is Major Partner of 2	$-1.17^{***}$ (-1.44, -0.90)	-0.19(-0.33, -0.04)		
KOF 2:2 Is Major Partner of 1	-0.40***(-0.67, -0.12)	$-0.51^{***}$ (-0.65, -0.37)		
Trade/GDP 1:Trade/GDP 2	$-0.01^{***}$ (-0.01, -0.01)	$-0.001 \; (-0.003,  0.0001)$		
Democracy 1:Democracy 2	0.15*** (0.08, 0.23)	-0.18*** (-0.21, -0.14)		
Constant	-13.60*** (-14.02, -13.18)	-4.52*** (-4.74, -4.30)		
Observations	116954	116954		
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.419	0.338		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.419	0.338		
Note:	*p<	<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		




Figure A.22: Coefficients and 95% confidence bounds from lagged events, original KOF scale model  $\,$ 




Figure A.23: Predicted levels of cooperation and conflict, with 95% confidence intervals, over the 25%-75% range of global economic exposure, from year FE, omitted dependence model

### Appendix L. Lagged DV Model with all third party events

In this section, we rerun the analysis controlling for states' conflict and cooperation initiation with other countries. The results remain mostly the same, except the positive effect of NMTP's economic exposure on cooperation becomes insignificant. It should also be noted that in this model we find a negative and significant effect of NMTP's economic exposure on conflict.

Table A.12: OLS coefficients and 95 percent confidence bounds for lagged events model, 1995-2012

	Dependent Variables			
	Cooperation	Conflict		
Coop Level	0.31*** (0.30, 0.31)	0.04*** (0.03, 0.04)		
Conf Level	0.14*** (0.13, 0.15)	0.42*** (0.41, 0.42)		
Coop with Others 1	0.45*** (0.43, 0.47)	$0.04^{***}$ (0.03, 0.05)		
Conf with Others 1	$-0.01 \; (-0.01,  0.003)$	0.02*** (0.02, 0.02)		
Coop with Others 2	0.40*** (0.38, 0.42)	0.05*** (0.04, 0.06)		
Conf with Others 2	0.002 (-0.01, 0.01)	$0.02^{***}$ (0.02, 0.03)		
KOF 1	0.02 (-0.15, 0.19)	$-0.16^*$ (-0.25, -0.06)		
KOF 2	0.06 (-0.11, 0.23)	$-0.16^*$ ( $-0.26$ , $-0.07$ )		
Mutual Major Trade Partners	0.79*** (0.71, 0.87)	0.24*** (0.19, 0.28)		
1 Is Major Partner of 2	0.80*** (0.75, 0.86)	0.03 (0.001, 0.06)		
2 Is Major Partner of 1	0.82*** (0.77, 0.88)	0.04 (0.01, 0.07)		
Trade/GDP 1	0.02*** (0.01, 0.03)	0.04*** (0.04, 0.05)		
Trade/GDP 2	0.02*** (0.01, 0.03)	$0.05^{***}$ (0.04, 0.05)		
Trade Balance	$-0.001 \; (-0.005,  0.003)$	$-0.0001 \; (-0.002,  0.002)$		
CINC Ratio	$-0.01 \; (-0.04,  0.03)$	$-0.01 \; (-0.04,  0.01)$		
log Distance	-0.31***(-0.32, -0.30)	$-0.01^*$ ( $-0.02$ , $-0.01$ )		
log Population 1	0.02 (-0.01, 0.05)	0.01 (-0.01, 0.02)		
log Population 2	$0.03^*$ (-0.002, 0.06)	$-0.03^*$ ( $-0.04$ , $-0.01$ )		
log GDP 1	0.08*** (0.05, 0.11)	0.03** (0.02, 0.05)		
log GDP 2	0.09*** (0.06, 0.12)	$0.03^*$ (0.01, 0.04)		
Democracy 1	-0.16***(-0.21, -0.10)	0.15*** (0.11, 0.18)		
Democracy 2	-0.21***(-0.26, -0.15)	$0.10^{***}$ (0.07, 0.13)		
Alliance	0.55*** (0.50, 0.60)	0.23*** (0.20, 0.25)		
Contiguity	-0.18*** (-0.28, -0.09)	0.27*** (0.22, 0.32)		
KOF 1:Mutual Major Trade Partners	-1.66***(-2.03, -1.29)	-1.18*** (-1.39, -0.98)		
KOF 1:1 Is Major Partner of 2	-0.71***(-0.99, -0.42)	-0.45***(-0.61, -0.29)		
KOF 1:2 Is Major Partner of 1	-0.88***(-1.16, -0.59)	-0.03 (-0.19, 0.13)		
KOF 2:Mutual Major Trade Partners	-1.63***(-2.00, -1.26)	$-1.45^{***}$ (-1.65, -1.24)		
KOF 2:1 Is Major Partner of 2	-0.89***(-1.18, -0.61)	-0.19 (-0.34, -0.03)		
KOF 2:2 Is Major Partner of 1	-0.71***(-1.00, -0.42)	$-0.62^{***}$ (-0.78, -0.47)		
Trade/GDP 1:Trade/GDP 2	-0.01***(-0.01, -0.01)	$-0.002^*$ (-0.004, -0.001)		
Democracy 1:Democracy 2	0.16*** (0.09, 0.23)	-0.23***(-0.27, -0.19)		
Constant	-9.03*** (-9.50, -8.55)	-4.47*** (-4.74, -4.21)		
Observations	106110	106110		
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.424	0.311		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.423	0.311		
Note:	*p	o<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		




Figure A.24: Coefficients and 95% confidence bounds from lagged events, original KOF scale model  $\,$ 




Figure A.25: Predicted levels of cooperation and conflict, with 95% confidence intervals, over the 25%-75% range of global economic exposure, from year FE, omitted dependence model

### Appendix M. Lagged DV Model excluding zero values in DVs

In this section, we rerun the analysis excluding years where states have no interactions (neither cooperation nor conflict). The results are mostly the same as the main model's with the exception of cooperation when only a state itself is a MTP and conflict when only the target is a MTP. Additionally, when states do interact with each other, the difference between MTP and NMTP dissipates as a state's economic exposure reaches the higher end.

Table A.13: OLS coefficients and 95 percent confidence bounds for lagged events model, 1995-2012

	Dependent Variables		
	Cooperation	Conflict	
Coop Level	0.69*** (0.67, 0.70)	0.23*** (0.22, 0.24)	
Conf Level	0.16*** (0.15, 0.17)	$0.41^{***}$ (0.40, 0.41)	
KOF 1	0.61*** (0.38, 0.84)	-0.13 (-0.28, 0.01)	
KOF 2	0.66*** (0.43, 0.89)	-0.10 (-0.25, 0.05)	
Mutual Major Trade Partners	0.71*** (0.61, 0.80)	0.14*** (0.08, 0.20)	
1 Is Major Partner of 2	0.82*** (0.75, 0.89)	-0.01 (-0.05, 0.04)	
2 Is Major Partner of 1	$0.85^{***}$ (0.77, 0.92)	0.01 (-0.03, 0.06)	
Trade/GDP 1	-0.01** (-0.03, -0.0003)	0.04*** (0.03, 0.05)	
Trade/GDP 2	-0.01**(-0.03, -0.001)	0.04*** (0.04, 0.05)	
Trade Balance	-0.001 (-0.01, 0.005)	0.001 (-0.002, 0.004)	
CINC Ratio	-0.0002 (-0.05, 0.05)	-0.03 (-0.06, 0.003)	
log Distance	-0.32***(-0.34, -0.30)	-0.01 (-0.02, 0.01)	
log Population 1	$0.01 \; (-0.02, 0.05)$	0.002 (-0.02, 0.03)	
log Population 2	0.02 (-0.02, 0.06)	-0.05**(-0.07, -0.02)	
log GDP 1	0.32*** (0.28, 0.36)	0.09*** (0.06, 0.11)	
log GDP 2	0.33*** (0.29, 0.37)	0.08*** (0.06, 0.11)	
Democracy 1	-0.39***(-0.46, -0.31)	0.20*** (0.16, 0.25)	
Democracy 2	$-0.41^{***}$ (-0.49, -0.33)	0.15*** (0.10, 0.20)	
Alliance	0.51*** (0.45, 0.57)	$0.25^{***}$ (0.21, 0.29)	
Contiguity	-0.56***(-0.68, -0.45)	0.26*** (0.19, 0.33)	
KOF 1:Mutual Major Trade Partners	-1.15***(-1.58, -0.71)	$-1.01^{***}$ (-1.28, -0.73)	
KOF 1:1 Is Major Partner of 2	-0.05 (-0.41, 0.31)	$-0.48^{***}$ (-0.71, -0.26)	
KOF 1:2 Is Major Partner of 1	-0.93***(-1.30, -0.57)	0.17 (-0.06, 0.39)	
KOF 2:Mutual Major Trade Partners	-1.03***(-1.47, -0.60)	$-1.42^{***}$ (-1.69, -1.14)	
KOF 2:1 Is Major Partner of 2	$-0.91^{***}$ (-1.27, -0.54)	$-0.20 \ (-0.43, 0.02)$	
KOF 2:2 Is Major Partner of 1	-0.17 (-0.54, 0.19)	$-0.74^{***}$ (-0.96, -0.51)	
Trade/GDP 1:Trade/GDP 2	$-0.01^{***}$ (-0.01, -0.01)	-0.002 (-0.004, 0.0003)	
Democracy 1:Democracy 2	0.23*** (0.14, 0.33)	$-0.32^{***}$ (-0.38, -0.26)	
Constant	-16.03*** (-16.60, -15.46)	-6.63*** (-6.99, -6.27)	
Observations	66859	66859	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.363	0.334	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.363	0.333	

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01




Figure A.26: Coefficients and 95% confidence bounds from lagged events, original KOF scale model  $\,$ 




Figure A.27: Predicted levels of cooperation and conflict, with 95% confidence intervals, over the 25%-75% range of global economic exposure, from year FE, omitted dependence model

## Appendix N. Correlation between KOF and Major Trade Partners

In this section, we present plots demonstrating the correlation between the KOF index and the number of major trade partners a state has. To compose these figures, we use state-level data. It appears the KOF index is strongly and positively correlated with the number of major trade partners in export. In comparison, the correlation between KOF and major importers is negative yet non-significant, though when the KOF index is at the higher end the correlation appears to be positive. This result suggests (1) economic exposure is a very different concept from a simple count of major trade partners; (2) how states interact differently with their major exporters and importers deserves further examination.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>See also Figure 1 in the paper and Appendix I.




Figure A.28: Correlation plot between KOF and major trade partners (export). The blue line denotes the smooth line between the two variables using the GAM method. Text in the plot denotes the Pearson correlation coefficient with the related p-value. Darker color of points denote more data, while rug marks on X and Y axis denote the distribution of the respective variable.




Figure A.29: Correlation plot between KOF and major trade partners (import). The blue line denotes the smooth line between the two variables using the GAM method. Text in the plot denotes the Pearson correlation coefficient with the related p-value. Darker color of points denote more data, while rug marks on X and Y axis denote the distribution of the respective variable.

## Appendix O. Summary statistics

In this section, we present the summary statistics in Table A.14.  $\,$ 

Table A.14: Summary Statistics

	median	mean	std.dev	min	max
log Cooperation	-4.61	-3.17	2.91	-4.61	8.75
log Confict	-4.61	-4.41	1.13	-4.61	8.78
KOF 1	0.59	0.58	0.17	0.16	0.98
KOF 2	0.59	0.58	0.17	0.16	0.98
Mutual Major Trade Partners	0	0.03	0.18	0	1
1 Is Major Partner of 2	0	0.09	0.28	0	1
2 Is Major Partner of 1	0	0.09	0.28	0	1
Trade/GDP 1	0.01	0.30	2.07	0	449.30
Trade/GDP 2	0.01	0.30	2.07	0	449.30
Trade Balance	0	0	5.21	-22.13	22.13
CINC Ratio	0	0	3.30	-12.82	12.82
log Distance	8.66	8.20	1.66	0	9.86
log Population 1	16.09	15.96	1.95	9.76	21.02
log Population 2	16.09	15.96	1.95	9.76	21.02
log GDP 1	25.13	25.15	2.16	18.81	30.40
log GDP 2	25.13	25.15	2.16	18.81	30.40
Democracy 1	0	0.49	0.50	0	1
Democracy 2	0	0.49	0.50	0	1

Total number of observation: 321544