

# Supplementary appendix for “US Sanctions and Foreign Lobbying of the US Government”

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# 1 Introduction

This appendix presents additional models to demonstrate the robustness of our results, as well as summary statistics for our data.

## 2 Omitting year FE

We present our main results omitting the year fixed effects present in our primary models. We consider it worth presenting these alternate models because fixed effects models are considerably less efficient than models excluding time-specific effects. However, in these alternate models, we add a dichotomous variable to capture the potentially unique character of the Cold War to retain a control for distinct periods in US foreign policy. Results in Tables [A.1](#) and [A.2](#) look essentially identical to our main models. One slight difference can be seen in Table [A.2](#) presenting models examining sanctions over economic issues, where coefficients for continuing direct sanctions are slightly larger in magnitude and significant at the 0.05 level in each model. The p-values for these coefficients in our main models were just above 0.05.

## 3 Alternate contexts

Our main models examine two different contexts through which US sanctions could affect perceptions by third-party leaders and thereby affect the degree to which they engage in lobbying of the US government. Specifically, we consider alliance context, as well as contiguous ally context. Here, we present models in which we consider only contiguous context, to examine whether our results hold only when US sanctions affect a geographically proximate state irrespective of political affinity.

As would be expected, our results in Table [A.3](#) examining direct US sanctions remain consistent with those presented in the main models. With respect to US sanctions against a third-party, we find mixed results. Considering sanctions over security and political issues, we find a positive and significant association of continuing US sanctions against a third party only when including all observations—even those for states that never lobby the US government. With respect to US sanctions over economic issues, we find that termination of US sanctions against a third party is consistently associated with a reduction in lobbying. This result is in line with our findings for the ally/contiguous context in the main paper, suggesting that spatial/geographic proximity might prompt anticipatory lobbying more than “political proximity,” or affinity.

We also present another context for third-party informational effects: PTA context, using data on PTA membership from [Dür, Baccini and Elsig \(2014\)](#). We code the third party sanctions variables as equal to one if sanctions onset, continuation, or termination occurs for a third-party state maintaining mutual membership in a PTA. Results are quite interesting, as we find no effects for third-party sanctions over security and political issues, yet find that newly imposed sanctions against a PTA partner over an economic issue are associated with an increase in lobbying the US government.

Table A.1: Autoregressive model coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals. US sanctions and foreign lobbying of the US government 1975-2005, security and political issues.

	DV = Lobbying dollars (log)			
	Ally context		Ally/contiguous context	
New direct sanctions	-2.16** (-3.75, -0.58)	-2.23** (-3.85, -0.62)	-1.96* (-3.64, -0.28)	-2.02* (-3.74, -0.30)
Continued direct sanctions	-0.24 (-0.81, 0.33)	-0.23 (-0.82, 0.37)	-0.24 (-0.81, 0.34)	-0.23 (-0.82, 0.37)
Ended direct sanctions	-0.49 (-2.26, 1.28)	-0.56 (-2.33, 1.21)	-0.61 (-2.40, 1.18)	-0.66 (-2.45, 1.13)
New third-party sanctions	0.77 (-0.67, 2.20)	0.89 (-0.69, 2.48)	-0.58 (-1.98, 0.82)	-0.64 (-2.10, 0.81)
Continued third-party sanctions	0.45 (-0.07, 0.97)	0.38 (-0.18, 0.94)	0.37 (-0.05, 0.80)	0.27 (-0.17, 0.71)
Ended third-party sanctions	1.51 (-0.14, 3.15)	1.74* (0.02, 3.46)	1.03 (-0.56, 2.62)	0.98 (-0.64, 2.60)
Cold War	-0.20 (-0.59, 0.19)	-0.21 (-0.62, 0.20)	-0.28 (-0.65, 0.08)	-0.30 (-0.68, 0.09)
Low income	-0.95** (-1.60, -0.29)	-0.93** (-1.61, -0.25)	-0.89** (-1.56, -0.22)	-0.88* (-1.57, -0.19)
Democracy	0.39 (-0.10, 0.89)	0.48 (-0.05, 1.01)	0.35 (-0.15, 0.85)	0.44 (-0.09, 0.98)
Dyadic alliance	0.42 (-0.29, 1.12)	0.27 (-0.47, 1.01)	0.45 (-0.25, 1.15)	0.31 (-0.42, 1.05)
Distance (log)	-0.12 (-0.72, 0.48)	-0.28 (-0.92, 0.37)	-0.12 (-0.70, 0.46)	-0.26 (-0.89, 0.37)
Lag (1) lobbying dollars (log)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.60)	0.56*** (0.51, 0.60)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.60)	0.56*** (0.51, 0.60)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.13)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.13)	0.09*** (0.04, 0.13)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.13)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.06** (0.02, 0.10)	0.06** (0.02, 0.10)	0.06** (0.02, 0.10)	0.06** (0.02, 0.10)
Lag (4) lobbying dollars (log)	0.02 (-0.03, 0.06)	0.01 (-0.03, 0.06)	0.01 (-0.03, 0.06)	0.01 (-0.03, 0.06)
Lag (5) lobbying dollars (log)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)
Constant	2.38 (-3.46, 8.23)	4.02 (-2.29, 10.33)	2.56 (-3.04, 8.17)	3.99 (-2.07, 10.05)
Observations	3,228	3,084	3,228	3,084
Restrictions	None	No all-0 DV	None	No all-0 DV
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.58	0.56	0.58	0.56
F Statistic	281.74***	245.66***	281.93***	245.68***
BG order 1	0.28	0.24	0.12	0.12
BG order 2	0.76	0.45	0.7	0.37
BG order 3	2.06	1.96	1.68	1.5
BG order 4	3.85	3.14	3.3	2.5

\* p less than 0.05, \*\* p less than 0.01, \*\*\* p less than 0.001

Table A.2: Autoregressive model coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals. US sanctions and foreign lobbying of the US government 1975-2005, economic issues.

	DV = Lobbying dollars (log)			
	Ally context		Ally/contiguous context	
New direct sanctions	-1.10 (-2.99, 0.79)	-1.11 (-3.01, 0.78)	-0.95 (-2.86, 0.95)	-0.96 (-2.87, 0.95)
Continued direct sanctions	0.74* (0.07, 1.42)	0.74* (0.05, 1.42)	0.73* (0.05, 1.40)	0.74* (0.04, 1.43)
Ended direct sanctions	-0.36 (-4.34, 3.63)	-0.42 (-4.41, 3.57)	-0.34 (-4.37, 3.68)	-0.42 (-4.44, 3.61)
New third-party sanctions	0.81 (-0.28, 1.90)	0.81 (-0.33, 1.94)	-0.43 (-1.74, 0.88)	-0.53 (-1.86, 0.80)
Continued third-party sanctions	0.21 (-0.31, 0.73)	0.18 (-0.38, 0.73)	-0.01 (-0.49, 0.47)	-0.14 (-0.64, 0.37)
Ended third-party sanctions	-0.37 (-2.14, 1.41)	-0.46 (-2.23, 1.32)	-3.77* (-7.19, -0.35)	-3.88* (-7.29, -0.48)
Cold War	-0.07 (-0.48, 0.33)	-0.08 (-0.51, 0.35)	-0.20 (-0.62, 0.22)	-0.24 (-0.70, 0.21)
Low income	-0.85* (-1.57, -0.14)	-0.84* (-1.57, -0.11)	-0.84* (-1.54, -0.14)	-0.81* (-1.53, -0.09)
Democracy	0.29 (-0.21, 0.79)	0.37 (-0.16, 0.91)	0.30 (-0.21, 0.81)	0.41 (-0.13, 0.95)
Dyadic alliance	0.34 (-0.38, 1.06)	0.19 (-0.57, 0.96)	0.36 (-0.37, 1.08)	0.21 (-0.55, 0.98)
Distance (log)	-0.14 (-0.72, 0.44)	-0.29 (-0.91, 0.33)	-0.18 (-0.76, 0.40)	-0.34 (-0.94, 0.26)
Lag (1) lobbying dollars (log)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.60)	0.56*** (0.51, 0.60)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.60)	0.55*** (0.51, 0.60)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.09*** (0.04, 0.13)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.13)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.13)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.13)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.06** (0.02, 0.09)	0.05** (0.02, 0.09)	0.06** (0.02, 0.09)	0.05** (0.02, 0.09)
Lag (4) lobbying dollars (log)	0.02 (-0.03, 0.06)	0.01 (-0.03, 0.06)	0.02 (-0.03, 0.06)	0.01 (-0.03, 0.06)
Lag (5) lobbying dollars (log)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)	0.09*** (0.04, 0.13)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)
Constant	2.56 (-3.10, 8.21)	4.12 (-1.88, 10.11)	3.09 (-2.43, 8.62)	4.78 (-0.96, 10.53)
Observations	3,228	3,084	3,228	3,084
Restrictions	None	No all-0 DV	None	No all-0 DV
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.58	0.56	0.58	0.56
F Statistic	281.43***	245.33***	281.98***	245.92***
BG order 1	0.54	0.49	0.75	0.68
BG order 2	0.94	0.65	1.01	0.75
BG order 3	1.99	1.8	1.7	1.54
BG order 4	3.33	2.62	3.07	2.36

\* p less than 0.05, \*\* p less than 0.01, \*\*\* p less than 0.001

Table A.3: Replication models, contiguity context for third-party sanctions.

	DV = Lobbying dollars (log)			
	Security/political issue		Economic issue	
New direct sanctions	-1.85** (-3.44, -0.26)	-1.89** (-3.53, -0.25)	-1.19 (-2.91, 0.54)	-1.19 (-2.96, 0.57)
Continued direct sanctions	-0.20 (-0.77, 0.37)	-0.18 (-0.77, 0.42)	0.64* (-0.01, 1.29)	0.63* (-0.03, 1.30)
Ended direct sanctions	-0.50 (-2.35, 1.35)	-0.56 (-2.46, 1.33)	-0.51 (-3.82, 2.80)	-0.55 (-3.94, 2.83)
New third-party sanctions	-0.87 (-2.14, 0.40)	-0.96 (-2.29, 0.37)	-0.11 (-1.40, 1.17)	-0.17 (-1.50, 1.16)
Continued third-party sanctions	0.50** (0.04, 0.96)	0.42* (-0.06, 0.91)	-0.06 (-0.55, 0.44)	-0.13 (-0.64, 0.39)
Ended third-party sanctions	0.39 (-0.98, 1.77)	0.36 (-1.07, 1.78)	-2.92** (-5.45, -0.39)	-3.05** (-5.77, -0.33)
Low income	-0.86*** (-1.47, -0.25)	-0.85*** (-1.48, -0.22)	-0.88*** (-1.50, -0.26)	-0.86*** (-1.49, -0.22)
Democracy	0.37 (-0.14, 0.87)	0.45* (-0.08, 0.99)	0.30 (-0.21, 0.81)	0.39 (-0.15, 0.93)
Dyadic alliance	0.46 (-0.16, 1.07)	0.32 (-0.33, 0.96)	0.35 (-0.28, 0.98)	0.21 (-0.45, 0.87)
Distance (log)	-0.11 (-0.69, 0.48)	-0.24 (-0.87, 0.40)	-0.18 (-0.75, 0.39)	-0.32 (-0.95, 0.31)
Lag (1) lobbying dollars (log)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.55*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.55*** (0.52, 0.59)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.09*** (0.05, 0.13)	0.09*** (0.05, 0.13)	0.09*** (0.05, 0.13)	0.09*** (0.05, 0.13)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.06*** (0.02, 0.10)	0.06*** (0.02, 0.10)	0.06*** (0.02, 0.10)	0.06*** (0.02, 0.10)
Lag (4) lobbying dollars (log)	0.02 (-0.02, 0.06)	0.02 (-0.03, 0.06)	0.02 (-0.02, 0.06)	0.02 (-0.02, 0.06)
Lag (5) lobbying dollars (log)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.11)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.11)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.11)
Constant	1.08 (-4.57, 6.72)	2.40 (-3.78, 8.58)	2.10 (-3.38, 7.59)	3.46 (-2.61, 9.52)
Restrictions	None	No all-0 DV	None	No all-0 DV
Observations	3,228	3,084	3,228	3,084
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.59	0.57	0.59	0.57
F Statistic	122.23***	106.80***	122.06***	106.70***

\* p less than 0.1, \*\* p less than 0.05, \*\*\* p less than 0.01

Table A.4: Replication models, PTA context for third-party sanctions.

	DV = Lobbying dollars (log)			
	Security/political issue		Economic issue	
New direct sanctions	−1.99** (−3.58, −0.41)	−2.07** (−3.69, −0.44)	−1.23 (−2.96, 0.50)	−1.25 (−3.01, 0.52)
Continued direct sanctions	−0.13 (−0.70, 0.44)	−0.11 (−0.70, 0.48)	0.66** (0.01, 1.31)	0.65* (−0.01, 1.32)
Ended direct sanctions	−0.40 (−2.25, 1.45)	−0.48 (−2.37, 1.41)	−0.42 (−3.74, 2.90)	−0.47 (−3.86, 2.92)
New third-party sanctions	0.12 (−1.19, 1.43)	0.14 (−1.23, 1.51)	0.48 (−0.64, 1.61)	0.59 (−0.59, 1.77)
Continued third-party sanctions	0.07 (−0.46, 0.60)	0.12 (−0.43, 0.68)	−0.13 (−0.67, 0.41)	−0.10 (−0.66, 0.46)
Ended third-party sanctions	−0.51 (−3.25, 2.24)	−0.51 (−3.39, 2.36)	0.16 (−1.96, 2.29)	0.28 (−1.96, 2.52)
Cold War	−1.13 (−2.54, 0.28)	−1.15 (−2.62, 0.32)	−1.07 (−2.51, 0.36)	−1.09 (−2.59, 0.40)
Low income	−0.94*** (−1.55, −0.34)	−0.92*** (−1.54, −0.29)	−0.85*** (−1.47, −0.24)	−0.84*** (−1.47, −0.20)
Democracy	0.36 (−0.14, 0.87)	0.45* (−0.08, 0.99)	0.33 (−0.18, 0.84)	0.42 (−0.12, 0.96)
Dyadic alliance	0.45 (−0.18, 1.07)	0.28 (−0.37, 0.94)	0.39 (−0.25, 1.04)	0.23 (−0.45, 0.90)
Distance (log)	−0.19 (−0.77, 0.39)	−0.34 (−0.97, 0.30)	−0.16 (−0.74, 0.41)	−0.31 (−0.95, 0.32)
Lag (1) lobbying dollars (log)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.55*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.55*** (0.52, 0.59)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.09*** (0.05, 0.13)	0.09*** (0.05, 0.13)	0.09*** (0.05, 0.13)	0.09*** (0.05, 0.13)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.06*** (0.02, 0.10)	0.06*** (0.02, 0.10)	0.06*** (0.02, 0.10)	0.06*** (0.02, 0.10)
Lag (4) lobbying dollars (log)	0.02 (−0.02, 0.06)	0.02 (−0.03, 0.06)	0.02 (−0.02, 0.06)	0.02 (−0.02, 0.06)
Lag (5) lobbying dollars (log)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.11)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.11)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.11)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.11)
Constant	3.34 (−2.22, 8.91)	4.73 (−1.36, 10.82)	2.98 (−2.48, 8.44)	4.45 (−1.59, 10.49)
Restrictions	None	No all-0 DV	None	No all-0 DV
Observations	3,228	3,084	3,228	3,084
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.59	0.57	0.59	0.57
F Statistic	121.72***	106.42***	121.81***	106.48***

\* p less than 0.1, \*\* p less than 0.05, \*\*\* p less than 0.01

## 4 Alternate coding of sanctions issues

Our main sanctions variables are coded in order to isolate economic issues—often escalated trade disputes—from more salient issues over which states might use sanctions. However, one might question the coding decisions that went into this classification. Here, we show that results look generally consistent when tweaking coding procedures.

First, Table A.5 presents models in which we reclassify security issues to exclude purely “political” issues that might not prompt a security threat by the sender—specifically omitting human rights and demands for the target to release sender property. Results are largely in line with those presented in the Table 1 in the main paper.

Table A.5: Replication models, examining security issues but removing political issues.

	DV = Lobbying dollars (log)			
	Ally context		Ally/contiguous context	
New direct sanctions	−2.81*** (−4.41, −1.21)	−2.91*** (−4.56, −1.25)	−2.74** (−4.38, −1.10)	−2.83** (−4.52, −1.14)
Continued direct sanctions	−0.18 (−0.78, 0.42)	−0.25 (−0.87, 0.36)	−0.19 (−0.79, 0.41)	−0.25 (−0.87, 0.37)
Ended direct sanctions	−1.05 (−3.12, 1.02)	−1.15 (−3.29, 1.00)	−1.14 (−3.22, 0.93)	−1.22 (−3.38, 0.93)
New third-party sanctions	1.07 (−0.37, 2.51)	1.21 (−0.33, 2.75)	−0.02 (−1.26, 1.22)	−0.06 (−1.36, 1.24)
Continued third-party sanctions	0.38 (−0.13, 0.90)	0.31 (−0.24, 0.85)	0.45* (0.01, 0.89)	0.36 (−0.09, 0.82)
Ended third-party sanctions	2.35 (−0.24, 4.94)	2.77 (−0.02, 5.56)	0.86 (−1.00, 2.72)	0.82 (−1.11, 2.74)
Cold War	−0.21 (−0.68, 0.25)	−0.23 (−0.71, 0.26)	−0.27 (−0.73, 0.19)	−0.28 (−0.76, 0.20)
Low income	−0.94** (−1.55, −0.33)	−0.93** (−1.56, −0.31)	−0.85** (−1.47, −0.23)	−0.85** (−1.48, −0.22)
Democracy	0.42 (−0.08, 0.93)	0.52 (−0.02, 1.06)	0.37 (−0.14, 0.88)	0.46 (−0.08, 1.00)
Dyadic alliance	0.41 (−0.21, 1.03)	0.23 (−0.42, 0.89)	0.46 (−0.15, 1.08)	0.31 (−0.34, 0.96)
Distance (log)	−0.10 (−0.70, 0.49)	−0.31 (−0.98, 0.37)	−0.12 (−0.70, 0.45)	−0.27 (−0.91, 0.37)
Lag (1) lobbying dollars (log)	0.56*** (0.53, 0.59)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.56*** (0.53, 0.59)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.59)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.06** (0.02, 0.10)	0.06** (0.02, 0.10)	0.06** (0.02, 0.10)	0.06** (0.02, 0.10)
Lag (4) lobbying dollars (log)	0.02 (−0.02, 0.06)	0.02 (−0.03, 0.06)	0.02 (−0.02, 0.06)	0.01 (−0.03, 0.05)
Lag (5) lobbying dollars (log)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.11)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.12)
Constant	2.26 (−3.49, 8.01)	4.34 (−2.16, 10.84)	2.50 (−2.98, 7.98)	4.01 (−2.08, 10.10)
Restrictions	None	No all-0 DV	None	No all-0 DV
Observations	3,228	3,084	3,228	3,084
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.58	0.56	0.58	0.56
F Statistic	282.67***	246.69***	282.48***	246.24***

\* p less than 0.05, \*\* p less than 0.01, \*\*\* p less than 0.001

Second, Table A.6 presents models in which we reclassify economic issues to include only those

where the anticipated target costs of the initial sanction threat were low. Results are consistent with those in Table 2 in the main paper.

## 5 Combined models

Next, we present models in which we include variables for sanctions over both political/security issues as well as economic issues. Table A.7 presents results that are consistent with those in Tables 1 and 2 in the main text.

## 6 State fixed effects

Our primary models account for history with five lags of the dependent variable, which might account country-specific lobbying patterns. We prefer the auto-regressive (AR) model approach more than an alternate, fixed effects approach because we think that between-state variation is meaningful. And though spurious correlation could be more likely when including between-state variation, five lags of the dependent variable should incorporate a lot of—modeled and un-modeled—factors affecting lobbying. Further, and perhaps most importantly, there might be few cases of within-state variation—i.e., where sanctions are imposed, continue, and then end—for us to assess how each of these transitions associate with change in foreign lobbying of the US government.

However, we do specify fixed effects models, which we present in Table A.8. We present only models where states that never lobby the US government are excluded, given that lack of lobbying variation within a state precludes estimation of within-state associations between lobbying and US sanctions.

Results do differ somewhat from those in our main models. Notably, our main finding for newly-imposed direct sanctions over security and political issues remains consistent. Interestingly, we also find that termination of direct sanctions over security and political issues are associated with a decline in lobbying. Notably, however, this variable is compared to a reference case in which sanctions were not present in years  $t$  or  $t-1$ —which might occur less often within states that experience termination of sanctions. Indeed, there are only two ways this outcome can occur. First, this reference category makes sense for a state that first experiences at least two years un-sanctioned, but then at some point faces both the onset and then termination of sanctions. Second, a state could face sanctions for a number of years and then face termination, after which it remains un-sanctioned for at least two years. It is possible that the comparison of sanctions termination to a mix of these two reference cases has produced the unusual finding.

Also contrary to our main findings, we find no association between direct sanctions over economic issues and lobbying. In this case, there are relatively few states that experience the transition from no third-party sanctions to third-party sanctions onset (though there are many cases in which third-party sanctions continue). However, we retain the finding that, in the ally/contiguous context, termination of third-party US sanctions results in a decline in lobbying.



Table A.6: Replication models, low-cost economic issues.

	DV = Lobbying dollars (log)			
	Ally context		Ally/contiguous context	
New direct sanctions	-1.09 (-2.80, 0.62)	-1.10 (-2.84, 0.65)	-0.96 (-2.67, 0.75)	-0.96 (-2.71, 0.78)
Continued direct sanctions	0.83* (0.18, 1.47)	0.82* (0.16, 1.48)	0.82* (0.17, 1.48)	0.83* (0.17, 1.50)
Ended direct sanctions	-0.33 (-3.65, 2.99)	-0.40 (-3.79, 2.99)	-0.34 (-3.66, 2.97)	-0.41 (-3.80, 2.98)
New third-party sanctions - ally	0.82 (-0.29, 1.93)	0.82 (-0.34, 1.98)		
Continued third-party sanctions - ally	0.20 (-0.31, 0.72)	0.17 (-0.37, 0.71)		
Ended third-party sanctions - ally	-0.12 (-1.80, 1.56)	-0.21 (-1.92, 1.51)		
New third-party sanctions - ally/cont			-0.15 (-1.42, 1.11)	-0.25 (-1.55, 1.05)
Continued third-party sanctions - ally/cont			-0.05 (-0.57, 0.46)	-0.17 (-0.71, 0.36)
Ended third-party sanctions - ally/cont			-3.77* (-6.84, -0.70)	-3.88* (-7.01, -0.74)
Cold War	-0.06 (-0.56, 0.44)	-0.07 (-0.59, 0.46)	-0.19 (-0.70, 0.32)	-0.24 (-0.77, 0.30)
Low income	-0.84** (-1.46, -0.22)	-0.83* (-1.47, -0.19)	-0.83** (-1.45, -0.20)	-0.80* (-1.44, -0.16)
Democracy	0.29 (-0.22, 0.81)	0.38 (-0.17, 0.93)	0.31 (-0.21, 0.82)	0.41 (-0.13, 0.96)
Dyadic alliance	0.35 (-0.27, 0.98)	0.21 (-0.45, 0.86)	0.38 (-0.25, 1.01)	0.24 (-0.42, 0.89)
Distance (log)	-0.12 (-0.70, 0.46)	-0.27 (-0.92, 0.38)	-0.16 (-0.74, 0.41)	-0.33 (-0.96, 0.31)
Lag (1) lobbying dollars (log)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.55*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.55*** (0.52, 0.59)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.09*** (0.05, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.06** (0.02, 0.10)	0.05* (0.01, 0.09)	0.06** (0.02, 0.10)	0.05** (0.01, 0.10)
Lag (4) lobbying dollars (log)	0.02 (-0.02, 0.06)	0.01 (-0.03, 0.05)	0.02 (-0.02, 0.06)	0.01 (-0.03, 0.06)
Lag (5) lobbying dollars (log)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.11)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.12)
Constant	2.35 (-3.22, 7.91)	3.87 (-2.32, 10.06)	2.93 (-2.51, 8.36)	4.59 (-1.44, 10.63)
Restrictions	None	No all-0 DV	None	No all-0 DV
Observations	3,228	3,084	3,228	3,084
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.58	0.56	0.58	0.56
F Statistic	281.56***	245.44***	282.08***	246.02***

\* p less than 0.05, \*\* p less than 0.01, \*\*\* p less than 0.001

Table A.7: Replication models, combining all issues types.

	DV = Lobbying dollars (log)			
	Ally context		Contiguity/ally context	
New direct sanctions - S/P	-2.14** (-3.66, -0.62)	-2.21** (-3.78, -0.64)	-1.97* (-3.52, -0.42)	-2.02* (-3.62, -0.43)
Continued direct sanctions - S/P	-0.21 (-0.78, 0.36)	-0.20 (-0.79, 0.39)	-0.22 (-0.79, 0.35)	-0.19 (-0.79, 0.40)
Ended direct sanctions - S/P	-0.49 (-2.34, 1.37)	-0.55 (-2.44, 1.34)	-0.50 (-2.36, 1.35)	-0.55 (-2.44, 1.34)
New third-party sanctions - S/P	0.61 (-0.86, 2.08)	0.73 (-0.85, 2.32)	-0.56 (-1.78, 0.66)	-0.60 (-1.88, 0.67)
Continued third-party sanctions - S/P	0.45 (-0.14, 1.03)	0.38 (-0.24, 1.00)	0.37 (-0.09, 0.83)	0.28 (-0.20, 0.76)
Ended third-party sanctions - S/P	1.48 (-1.01, 3.96)	1.70 (-0.96, 4.37)	1.06 (-0.64, 2.77)	1.03 (-0.73, 2.79)
New direct sanctions - E	-0.93 (-2.64, 0.78)	-0.94 (-2.69, 0.81)	-0.84 (-2.55, 0.87)	-0.85 (-2.59, 0.90)
Continued direct sanctions - E	0.79* (0.14, 1.43)	0.77* (0.11, 1.43)	0.71* (0.06, 1.35)	0.72* (0.06, 1.38)
Ended direct sanctions - E	-0.38 (-3.70, 2.94)	-0.44 (-3.83, 2.95)	-0.43 (-3.74, 2.89)	-0.50 (-3.89, 2.89)
New third-party sanctions - E	0.62 (-0.54, 1.78)	0.60 (-0.61, 1.82)	-0.46 (-1.75, 0.83)	-0.54 (-1.87, 0.79)
Continued third-party sanctions - E	0.07 (-0.50, 0.64)	0.07 (-0.52, 0.67)	-0.08 (-0.61, 0.45)	-0.17 (-0.72, 0.38)
Ended third-party sanctions - E	-0.51 (-2.24, 1.22)	-0.56 (-2.33, 1.21)	-3.94* (-7.01, -0.87)	-4.01* (-7.15, -0.87)
Cold War	-0.04 (-0.54, 0.46)	-0.05 (-0.58, 0.47)	-0.24 (-0.74, 0.27)	-0.28 (-0.81, 0.25)
Low income	-0.80* (-1.42, -0.17)	-0.79* (-1.43, -0.15)	-0.74* (-1.37, -0.10)	-0.72* (-1.36, -0.07)
Democracy	0.33 (-0.19, 0.84)	0.40 (-0.15, 0.95)	0.29 (-0.23, 0.81)	0.40 (-0.15, 0.95)
Dyadic alliance	0.29 (-0.34, 0.92)	0.15 (-0.52, 0.81)	0.34 (-0.30, 0.97)	0.21 (-0.45, 0.87)
Distance (log)	-0.13 (-0.73, 0.48)	-0.29 (-0.96, 0.38)	-0.15 (-0.74, 0.44)	-0.30 (-0.95, 0.35)
Lag (1) lobbying dollars (log)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.55*** (0.52, 0.59)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)	0.09*** (0.05, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.06** (0.02, 0.10)	0.06** (0.02, 0.10)	0.06** (0.02, 0.10)	0.06** (0.02, 0.10)
Lag (4) lobbying dollars (log)	0.01 (-0.03, 0.05)	0.01 (-0.03, 0.05)	0.01 (-0.03, 0.05)	0.01 (-0.03, 0.05)
Lag (5) lobbying dollars (log)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.11)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.12)
Constant	2.19 (-3.62, 8.00)	3.88 (-2.61, 10.37)	2.71 (-2.91, 8.34)	4.31 (-1.91, 10.52)
Restrictions	None	No all-0 DV	None	No all-0 DV
Observations	3,228	3,084	3,228	3,084
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.58	0.56	0.58	0.56
F Statistic	205.52***	179.21***	206.13***	179.72***

\* p less than 0.05, \*\* p less than 0.01, \*\*\* p less than 0.001

Table A.8: Replication models, including state fixed effects.

	DV = Lobbying dollars (log)			
	Security/political issue		Economic issue	
New direct sanctions	−2.07** (−3.57, −0.57)	−1.90* (−3.42, −0.37)	−1.83 (−3.70, 0.05)	−1.69 (−3.56, 0.19)
Continued direct sanctions	−0.84 (−1.83, 0.15)	−0.91 (−1.91, 0.08)	−0.78 (−1.66, 0.10)	−0.78 (−1.67, 0.12)
Ended direct sanctions	−2.42** (−4.18, −0.66)	−2.51** (−4.28, −0.75)	−0.75 (−4.27, 2.77)	−0.72 (−4.24, 2.79)
New third-party sanctions	0.26 (−1.21, 1.73)	−0.52 (−1.72, 0.67)	−0.06 (−1.18, 1.06)	−0.88 (−2.20, 0.44)
Continued third-party sanctions	0.65 (−0.18, 1.48)	0.72 (−0.02, 1.45)	0.30 (−0.42, 1.02)	−0.13 (−0.89, 0.63)
Ended third-party sanctions	0.81 (−1.44, 3.07)	0.57 (−1.06, 2.19)	−1.33 (−3.12, 0.47)	−7.25*** (−10.43, −4.08)
Cold War	1.50*** (0.71, 2.29)	1.42*** (0.63, 2.21)	1.26** (0.46, 2.06)	1.13** (0.33, 1.93)
Year counter	0.09*** (0.04, 0.13)	0.09*** (0.04, 0.13)	0.08** (0.03, 0.13)	0.09*** (0.04, 0.14)
Restrictions	No all-0 DV	No all-0 DV	No all-0 DV	No all-0 DV
Observations	4,146	4,146	4,146	4,146
R <sup>2</sup>	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
F Statistic	3.82***	4.23***	2.87**	5.12***

\* p less than 0.05, \*\* p less than 0.01, \*\*\* p less than 0.001

## 7 Excluding Cuba, North Korea, and Iran

Given that US sanctions against Cuba, North Korea, and Iran are particularly comprehensive, these states might look different, and could drive patterns we observe in our general models. Accordingly, we specify our main models excluding these states. As Tables A.9 and A.10 show, all results are consistent when we exclude these states.

## 8 Added controls

We also present models including additional control variables: specifically dyadic trade and armed conflict using data from CEPII. Tables A.11 and A.12 show that results are robust when considering security and political issues, but not when considering economic issues. However, it's important to note that controlling for trade could introduce post-treatment bias into our findings given that US sanctions over economic disputes are often escalated trade disputes.

## 9 Sanctions as the DV

Our theory and research design focus on the effect of US sanctions on lobbying in part because we suspected that strategic behavior could bias results looking in the other direction. However, we examine the impact of lobbying on sanctions imposition in three ways in order to assess whether an association—even if a biased one—is present. First, we examine sanction onset as the DV including all state years where US sanctions were not in place in the previous year using logit

Table A.9: Replication of Table 1, excluding Cuba, North Korea, and Iran.

	DV = Lobbying dollars (log)			
	Security/political issue		Economic issue	
New direct sanctions	-2.17** (-3.71, -0.62)	-2.23** (-3.82, -0.65)	-1.96* (-3.53, -0.39)	-2.01* (-3.62, -0.39)
Continued direct sanctions	-0.20 (-0.79, 0.39)	-0.25 (-0.85, 0.35)	-0.20 (-0.79, 0.39)	-0.24 (-0.85, 0.36)
Ended direct sanctions	-0.43 (-2.31, 1.45)	-0.50 (-2.41, 1.42)	-0.54 (-2.43, 1.34)	-0.60 (-2.52, 1.32)
New third-party sanctions	0.90 (-0.58, 2.38)	0.96 (-0.59, 2.52)	-0.59 (-1.81, 0.63)	-0.64 (-1.91, 0.63)
Continued third-party sanctions	0.46 (-0.08, 1.01)	0.44 (-0.13, 1.01)	0.36 (-0.09, 0.81)	0.29 (-0.18, 0.76)
Ended third-party sanctions	1.83 (-0.78, 4.45)	1.77 (-0.89, 4.44)	1.01 (-0.70, 2.72)	0.98 (-0.78, 2.74)
Cold War	-0.17 (-0.65, 0.31)	-0.17 (-0.67, 0.32)	-0.26 (-0.73, 0.21)	-0.27 (-0.75, 0.22)
Low income	-0.96** (-1.57, -0.35)	-0.93** (-1.55, -0.30)	-0.90** (-1.52, -0.29)	-0.88** (-1.51, -0.25)
Democracy	0.38 (-0.13, 0.89)	0.47 (-0.06, 1.01)	0.33 (-0.18, 0.84)	0.44 (-0.10, 0.98)
Dyadic alliance	0.31 (-0.32, 0.95)	0.25 (-0.40, 0.91)	0.36 (-0.27, 1.00)	0.30 (-0.35, 0.95)
Distance (log)	-0.27 (-0.92, 0.37)	-0.27 (-0.93, 0.40)	-0.26 (-0.89, 0.38)	-0.26 (-0.91, 0.39)
Lag (1) lobbying dollars (log)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.55*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.55*** (0.52, 0.59)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.09*** (0.05, 0.13)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)	0.09*** (0.05, 0.13)	0.09*** (0.04, 0.13)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.06** (0.02, 0.10)	0.05** (0.01, 0.10)	0.06** (0.02, 0.10)	0.06** (0.01, 0.10)
Lag (4) lobbying dollars (log)	0.02 (-0.02, 0.06)	0.02 (-0.02, 0.06)	0.02 (-0.02, 0.06)	0.02 (-0.03, 0.06)
Lag (5) lobbying dollars (log)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.12)
Constant	3.81 (-2.41, 10.04)	3.85 (-2.59, 10.29)	3.85 (-2.17, 9.86)	3.97 (-2.23, 10.18)
Restrictions	None	No all-0 DV	None	No all-0 DV
Observations	3,169	3,049	3,169	3,049
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.58	0.56	0.58	0.56
F Statistic	271.79***	241.49***	271.82***	241.45***

\* p less than 0.05, \*\* p less than 0.01, \*\*\* p less than 0.001

Table A.10: Replication of Table 2, excluding Cuba, North Korea, and Iran.

	DV = Lobbying dollars (log)			
	Security/political issue		Economic issue	
New direct sanctions	−1.10 (−2.84, 0.63)	−1.10 (−2.87, 0.67)	−0.95 (−2.68, 0.79)	−0.94 (−2.71, 0.83)
Continued direct sanctions	0.70* (0.06, 1.35)	0.69* (0.03, 1.35)	0.69* (0.03, 1.34)	0.69* (0.02, 1.35)
Ended direct sanctions	−0.75 (−4.24, 2.73)	−0.74 (−4.29, 2.81)	−0.72 (−4.21, 2.76)	−0.71 (−4.26, 2.83)
New third-party sanctions	0.82 (−0.33, 1.96)	0.83 (−0.35, 2.02)	−0.43 (−1.73, 0.87)	−0.51 (−1.84, 0.83)
Continued third-party sanctions	0.19 (−0.33, 0.72)	0.20 (−0.35, 0.75)	−0.01 (−0.53, 0.51)	−0.10 (−0.64, 0.44)
Ended third-party sanctions	−0.42 (−2.14, 1.30)	−0.46 (−2.22, 1.29)	−3.82* (−6.90, −0.73)	−3.90* (−7.04, −0.76)
Cold War	−0.05 (−0.56, 0.45)	−0.05 (−0.58, 0.48)	−0.18 (−0.69, 0.34)	−0.21 (−0.75, 0.33)
Low income	−0.88** (−1.50, −0.25)	−0.85** (−1.49, −0.21)	−0.86** (−1.49, −0.24)	−0.82* (−1.46, −0.18)
Democracy	0.27 (−0.25, 0.79)	0.37 (−0.18, 0.92)	0.28 (−0.24, 0.80)	0.40 (−0.15, 0.95)
Dyadic alliance	0.24 (−0.40, 0.89)	0.18 (−0.48, 0.84)	0.25 (−0.40, 0.90)	0.20 (−0.46, 0.86)
Distance (log)	−0.31 (−0.94, 0.32)	−0.29 (−0.94, 0.36)	−0.36 (−0.98, 0.26)	−0.35 (−0.98, 0.29)
Lag (1) lobbying dollars (log)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.55*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.56*** (0.52, 0.59)	0.55*** (0.52, 0.59)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.09*** (0.05, 0.13)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)	0.09*** (0.05, 0.13)	0.08*** (0.04, 0.12)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.05** (0.01, 0.09)	0.05* (0.01, 0.09)	0.05** (0.01, 0.09)	0.05* (0.01, 0.09)
Lag (4) lobbying dollars (log)	0.02 (−0.02, 0.06)	0.02 (−0.02, 0.06)	0.02 (−0.02, 0.06)	0.02 (−0.02, 0.06)
Lag (5) lobbying dollars (log)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.12)	0.09*** (0.05, 0.12)	0.08*** (0.05, 0.12)
Constant	4.22 (−1.80, 10.24)	4.12 (−2.08, 10.32)	4.80 (−1.06, 10.67)	4.80 (−1.24, 10.84)
Restrictions	None	No all-0 DV	None	No all-0 DV
Observations	3,169	3,049	3,169	3,049
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.58	0.56	0.58	0.56
F Statistic	271.36***	241.05***	271.92***	241.60***

\* p less than 0.05, \*\* p less than 0.01, \*\*\* p less than 0.001

Table A.11: Replication of Table 1 including added controls for trade and conflict.

	DV = Lobbying dollars (log)			
	Ally context		Ally/contiguous context	
New direct sanctions	−2.49** (−4.01, −0.98)	−2.57** (−4.13, −1.01)	−2.30** (−3.84, −0.76)	−2.36** (−3.95, −0.77)
Continued direct sanctions	−0.52 (−1.10, 0.05)	−0.57 (−1.17, 0.03)	−0.52 (−1.09, 0.06)	−0.57 (−1.17, 0.03)
Ended direct sanctions	−0.81 (−2.64, 1.03)	−0.86 (−2.74, 1.01)	−0.89 (−2.73, 0.95)	−0.94 (−2.82, 0.94)
New third-party sanctions	0.71 (−0.71, 2.13)	0.78 (−0.75, 2.31)	−0.62 (−1.83, 0.58)	−0.65 (−1.91, 0.61)
Continued third-party sanctions	0.34 (−0.19, 0.86)	0.37 (−0.20, 0.93)	0.21 (−0.24, 0.65)	0.17 (−0.29, 0.64)
Ended third-party sanctions	1.54 (−0.92, 4.01)	1.59 (−1.05, 4.23)	0.90 (−0.79, 2.59)	0.87 (−0.88, 2.62)
Trade (log)	0.34*** (0.26, 0.43)	0.35*** (0.26, 0.44)	0.34*** (0.26, 0.42)	0.35*** (0.26, 0.44)
Conflict	1.19 (−1.22, 3.60)	1.26 (−1.21, 3.72)	1.14 (−1.28, 3.55)	1.22 (−1.25, 3.68)
Cold War	0.01 (−0.47, 0.48)	−0.00 (−0.49, 0.49)	−0.07 (−0.54, 0.39)	−0.09 (−0.57, 0.40)
Low income	−0.45 (−1.07, 0.17)	−0.40 (−1.04, 0.23)	−0.42 (−1.04, 0.20)	−0.38 (−1.02, 0.26)
Democracy	0.16 (−0.35, 0.66)	0.22 (−0.31, 0.76)	0.12 (−0.39, 0.63)	0.20 (−0.34, 0.74)
Dyadic alliance	−0.29 (−0.94, 0.35)	−0.31 (−0.98, 0.35)	−0.26 (−0.90, 0.38)	−0.27 (−0.94, 0.39)
Distance (log)	−0.56 (−1.17, 0.04)	−0.48 (−1.15, 0.18)	−0.56 (−1.16, 0.04)	−0.49 (−1.13, 0.16)
Lag (1) lobbying dollars (log)	0.54*** (0.50, 0.57)	0.54*** (0.50, 0.57)	0.54*** (0.50, 0.57)	0.54*** (0.50, 0.57)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.07*** (0.03, 0.11)	0.07*** (0.03, 0.11)	0.07*** (0.03, 0.11)	0.07*** (0.03, 0.11)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.05* (0.01, 0.09)	0.05* (0.01, 0.09)	0.05* (0.01, 0.09)	0.05* (0.01, 0.09)
Lag (4) lobbying dollars (log)	0.00 (−0.04, 0.04)	0.00 (−0.04, 0.04)	0.00 (−0.04, 0.04)	0.00 (−0.04, 0.04)
Lag (5) lobbying dollars (log)	0.06*** (0.03, 0.10)	0.06*** (0.03, 0.10)	0.06*** (0.03, 0.10)	0.06*** (0.03, 0.10)
Constant	4.96 (−0.80, 10.72)	4.20 (−2.20, 10.59)	5.14 (−0.48, 10.76)	4.45 (−1.72, 10.62)
Restrictions	None	No all-0 DV	None	No all-0 DV
Observations	3,209	3,065	3,209	3,065
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.59	0.56	0.59	0.56
F Statistic	254.96***	221.58***	254.97***	221.53***

\* p less than 0.05, \*\* p less than 0.01, \*\*\* p less than 0.001

Table A.12: Replication of Table 2 including added controls for trade and conflict.

	DV = Lobbying dollars (log)			
	Ally context		Ally/contiguous context	
New direct sanctions	-1.56 (-3.26, 0.15)	-1.56 (-3.31, 0.18)	-1.39 (-3.09, 0.31)	-1.40 (-3.14, 0.34)
Continued direct sanctions	0.16 (-0.49, 0.82)	0.14 (-0.53, 0.81)	0.17 (-0.49, 0.83)	0.16 (-0.52, 0.83)
Ended direct sanctions	-0.92 (-4.22, 2.39)	-0.90 (-4.28, 2.47)	-0.90 (-4.20, 2.40)	-0.90 (-4.27, 2.47)
New third-party sanctions	0.76 (-0.36, 1.88)	0.80 (-0.37, 1.98)	-0.54 (-1.82, 0.74)	-0.59 (-1.91, 0.73)
Continued third-party sanctions	0.04 (-0.47, 0.56)	0.07 (-0.48, 0.61)	-0.23 (-0.73, 0.28)	-0.30 (-0.83, 0.23)
Ended third-party sanctions	-0.54 (-2.24, 1.16)	-0.55 (-2.30, 1.19)	-4.08** (-7.13, -1.02)	-4.13** (-7.25, -1.02)
Trade (log)	0.33*** (0.25, 0.41)	0.33*** (0.24, 0.43)	0.34*** (0.25, 0.42)	0.34*** (0.25, 0.43)
Conflict	0.79 (-1.58, 3.15)	0.83 (-1.59, 3.24)	0.78 (-1.58, 3.14)	0.83 (-1.59, 3.24)
Cold War	0.01 (-0.49, 0.51)	0.00 (-0.52, 0.53)	-0.15 (-0.65, 0.36)	-0.19 (-0.72, 0.34)
Low income	-0.51 (-1.13, 0.12)	-0.47 (-1.12, 0.17)	-0.46 (-1.09, 0.17)	-0.41 (-1.06, 0.23)
Democracy	0.13 (-0.39, 0.64)	0.20 (-0.35, 0.74)	0.14 (-0.37, 0.66)	0.24 (-0.31, 0.79)
Dyadic alliance	-0.20 (-0.84, 0.44)	-0.23 (-0.90, 0.44)	-0.18 (-0.82, 0.46)	-0.21 (-0.88, 0.46)
Distance (log)	-0.51 (-1.10, 0.08)	-0.46 (-1.11, 0.18)	-0.54 (-1.12, 0.04)	-0.51 (-1.14, 0.13)
Lag (1) lobbying dollars (log)	0.54*** (0.50, 0.57)	0.54*** (0.50, 0.57)	0.54*** (0.50, 0.57)	0.54*** (0.50, 0.57)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.07*** (0.04, 0.11)	0.07*** (0.03, 0.11)	0.07*** (0.04, 0.11)	0.07*** (0.03, 0.11)
Lag (3) lobbying dollars (log)	0.05* (0.01, 0.09)	0.04* (0.00, 0.08)	0.05* (0.01, 0.09)	0.04* (0.00, 0.09)
Lag (4) lobbying dollars (log)	0.01 (-0.03, 0.04)	0.00 (-0.04, 0.04)	0.01 (-0.03, 0.05)	0.00 (-0.04, 0.04)
Lag (5) lobbying dollars (log)	0.07*** (0.03, 0.10)	0.06*** (0.03, 0.10)	0.07*** (0.03, 0.10)	0.07*** (0.03, 0.10)
Constant	4.68 (-0.87, 10.23)	4.25 (-1.91, 10.41)	5.04 (-0.38, 10.47)	4.80 (-1.20, 10.81)
Observations	3,209	3,065	3,209	3,065
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.59	0.56	0.59	0.56
F Statistic	253.57***	220.21***	254.31***	220.94***

\* p less than 0.05, \*\* p less than 0.01, \*\*\* p less than 0.001

models. Table A.13 suggests a positive association between lobbying and onset. However, we do not think that lobbying directly causes sanctions imposition. Instead, we suspect that potential targets increase lobbying as sanctions imposition becomes more likely. Table A.14 further shows that, when examining all state years where US sanctions were in place in the previous year, there is a negative association between lobbying and the termination of sanctions—at least with respect to security and political issues. Again, we suspect that no causal relationship is being demonstrated.

Finally, we test whether sanction threats escalate to imposition as a function of lobbying. Using TIES data on cases where the US is the primary sender, Table A.15 shows that lobbying has no systematic association with imposition, regardless of whether we condition its association on the type of issue underlying the sanction threat (security/political or economic).

Table A.13: New sanctions onset as the DV

	Sec/pol issues		Econ issues	
Lobbying (lagged)	0.03*	0.03	0.06**	0.05*
	(0.00, 0.06)	(−0.00, 0.06)	(0.01, 0.10)	(0.01, 0.09)
Lagged sanctions - econ issues	0.09	0.09		
	(−0.10, 0.28)	(−0.10, 0.28)		
Lagged sanctions - sec/pol issues			−0.30	−0.30
			(−0.99, 0.39)	(−0.98, 0.39)
Low income	1.77**	1.76**	−1.04**	−1.03**
	(0.49, 3.05)	(0.48, 3.05)	(−1.73, −0.35)	(−1.73, −0.34)
Democracy	0.04	−0.01	0.25	0.26
	(−0.56, 0.63)	(−0.62, 0.60)	(−0.48, 0.97)	(−0.47, 0.99)
Dyadic alliance	−0.24	−0.21	0.97*	0.92*
	(−1.09, 0.60)	(−1.05, 0.63)	(0.18, 1.76)	(0.13, 1.71)
Distance (log)	−0.57	−0.53	−0.63	−0.66
	(−1.30, 0.16)	(−1.27, 0.20)	(−1.36, 0.09)	(−1.41, 0.08)
Cold War	−0.94**	−0.93**	−1.86***	−1.86***
	(−1.57, −0.32)	(−1.56, −0.30)	(−2.74, −0.99)	(−2.73, −0.99)
Constant	−0.19	−0.47	1.96	2.29
	(−7.13, 6.75)	(−7.46, 6.51)	(−4.93, 8.84)	(−4.76, 9.34)
Observations	3,182	3,042	3,253	3,083
Log Likelihood	−303.51	−297.55	−212.15	−211.37

\* p less than 0.05, \*\* p less than 0.01, \*\*\* p less than 0.001



Table A.14: Sanctions termination as the DV

	Sec/pol issues		Econ issues	
Lobbying (lagged)	−0.04*	−0.05*	−0.01	−0.01
	(−0.08, −0.00)	(−0.08, −0.01)	(−0.10, 0.07)	(−0.10, 0.07)
Lagged sanctions - econ issues	−0.07	−0.07		
	(−0.47, 0.34)	(−0.46, 0.33)		
Lagged sanctions - sec/pol issues			0.48	0.48
			(−0.78, 1.75)	(−0.78, 1.75)
Low income	1.84*	1.81*	0.66	0.66
	(0.33, 3.36)	(0.29, 3.32)	(−0.98, 2.29)	(−0.98, 2.29)
Democracy	0.44	0.41	−0.14	−0.14
	(−0.29, 1.17)	(−0.33, 1.14)	(−1.76, 1.48)	(−1.76, 1.48)
Dyadic alliance	0.53	0.30	−1.82	−1.82
	(−0.28, 1.35)	(−0.59, 1.20)	(−4.08, 0.44)	(−4.08, 0.44)
Distance (log)	0.82	0.44	−1.77*	−1.77*
	(−0.04, 1.67)	(−0.58, 1.45)	(−3.25, −0.28)	(−3.25, −0.28)
Cold War	−0.25	−0.22	1.89*	1.89*
	(−0.96, 0.47)	(−0.93, 0.49)	(0.35, 3.43)	(0.35, 3.43)
Constant	−11.70**	−8.10	12.20	12.20
	(−19.83, −3.58)	(−17.75, 1.54)	(−1.25, 25.65)	(−1.25, 25.65)
Observations	623	593	552	552
Log Likelihood	−144.91	−143.35	−49.56	−49.56

\* p less than 0.05, \*\* p less than 0.01, \*\*\* p less than 0.001

Table A.15: Sanction threat escalation to imposition

	DV = Lobbying dollars (log)	
Lobbying dollars (log)	−0.01	−0.03
	(−0.04, 0.01)	(−0.06, 0.01)
Economic issue	−0.14	−0.33
	(−0.60, 0.32)	(−0.95, 0.30)
Lobbying X Economic issue		0.02
		(−0.03, 0.07)
Minor target costs	−16.92	−16.93
	(−1,233.95, 1,200.11)	(−1,230.85, 1,196.98)
Multilateral sanctions	0.62	0.60
	(−0.69, 1.93)	(−0.71, 1.92)
Institution-backed	−0.74	−0.72
	(−1.99, 0.51)	(−1.98, 0.53)
Cold War	−0.68*	−0.69*
	(−1.23, −0.14)	(−1.24, −0.15)
Constant	16.94	17.04
	(−1,200.09, 1,233.97)	(−1,196.88, 1,230.95)
Observations	381	381
Log Likelihood	−244.07	−243.70

\* p less than 0.05, \*\* p less than 0.01, \*\*\* p less than 0.001

## 10 Summary statistics

Finally, we present summary statistics for our main variables.

Table A.16: Summary statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Lobbying dollars (log)	3,929	5.106	9.046	−4.605	−4.605	13.567	21.751
Direct sanctions onset - sec/pol	3,929	0.018	0.134	0	0	0	1
Direct sanctions continuing - sec/pol	3,929	0.152	0.359	0	0	0	1
Direct sanctions ended - sec/pol	3,929	0.012	0.108	0	0	0	1
Direct sanctions onset - econ	3,929	0.012	0.111	0	0	0	1
Direct sanctions continuing - econ	3,929	0.138	0.345	0	0	0	1
Direct sanctions ended - econ	3,929	0.003	0.057	0	0	0	1
Third-party sanctions onset - sec/pol - ally context	3,929	0.023	0.149	0	0	0	1
Third-party sanctions continuing - sec/pol - ally context	3,929	0.715	0.451	0	0	1	1
Third-party sanctions ended - sec/pol - ally context	3,929	0.009	0.093	0	0	0	1
Third-party sanctions onset - econ - ally context	3,929	0.038	0.190	0	0	0	1
Third-party sanctions continuing - econ - ally context	3,929	0.541	0.498	0	0	1	1
Third-party sanctions ended - econ - ally context	3,929	0.012	0.110	0	0	0	1
Third-party sanctions onset - sec/pol - ally/contig context	3,929	0.032	0.175	0	0	0	1
Third-party sanctions continuing - sec/pol - ally/contig context	3,929	0.446	0.497	0	0	1	1
Third-party sanctions ended - sec/pol - ally/contig context	3,929	0.015	0.123	0	0	0	1
Third-party sanctions onset - econ - ally/contig context	3,929	0.025	0.155	0	0	0	1
Third-party sanctions continuing - econ - ally/contig context	3,929	0.320	0.467	0	0	1	1
Third-party sanctions ended - econ - ally/contig context	3,929	0.004	0.060	0	0	0	1
Low income	3,929	0.854	0.353	0	1	1	1
Democracy	3,929	0.384	0.486	0	0	1	1
Dyadic alliance	3,929	0.312	0.463	0	0	1	1
Weighted distance (log)	3,929	9.103	0.438	7.640	8.953	9.432	9.709
Cold War	3,929	0.385	0.487	0	0	1	1

## References

Dür, Andreas, Leonardo Baccini and Manfred Elsig. 2014. "The design of international trade agreements: Introducing a new dataset." *The Review of International Organizations* 9:353–375.