

# Appendix for “Contextualizing Individual Attitudes on Economic Statecraft”

March 13, 2024

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# 1 Introduction

This appendix presents additional models demonstrating the robustness of our results, tests of auxiliary preregistered hypotheses, additional (non-preregistered) models, and descriptive statistics demonstrating covariate balance across treatments.

## 2 Full models

Figures A-1, A-2, and A-3 are expanded versions of the figures of experiment results presented in the main text. In the main text, we did not present the estimates and confidence intervals for some explanatory variables (e.g., target country dummies). Nearly all of these country dummies are not statistically significant.




Figure A-1: Effects with 95% confidence intervals, H1, H4-H6




Figure A-2: Average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals, H2 & H3




Figure A-3: Marginal means with 95% confidence intervals, H2 & H3

### 3 Additional dependent variables

The main text presents results for our primary dependent variable: respondent support for the proposed policy. However, we also asked respondents to appraise the proposed policy in terms of: 1) its cost, 2) whether it advances US interests, 3) its effectiveness in obtaining target compliance, 4) its third-party signaling effect, and 5) the degree to which it demonstrates US strength. We pre-registered expectations that patterns would match those we obtain for policy support except with respect to costliness, where patterns would be reversed. When looking at responses for sanctions vs. inducements, these results suggest that respondents find sanctions to be more effective, less costly, more likely to signal US strength, more likely to serve US interests, and more likely to send a message to third parties considering bad behavior.

First, we present AMCEs and marginal means for each DV replicating Figure 3 (examining support without differencing across sanctions and inducements), as well as Figure 5, examining marginal means and differences subset by sanctions and inducements, as well as the difference (sanctions - inducements).




Figure A-4: Replication of Figure 3 for US interests DV




Figure A-5: Replication of Figure 5 for US interests DV




Figure A-6: Replication of Figure 3 for costly DV. Note: all expectations reversed relative to other DVs






Figure A-7: Replication of Figure 5 for costly DV. Note: all expectations reversed relative to other DVs




Figure A-8: Replication of Figure 3 for effectiveness DV




Figure A-9: Replication of Figure 5 for effectiveness DV




Figure A-10: Replication of Figure 3 for US strength DV




Figure A-11: Replication of Figure 5 for US strength DV




Figure A-12: Replication of Figure 3 for message DV




Figure A-13: Replication of Figure 5 for message DV

Further, we expect that these five additional variables could constitute observable implications of a single underlying dimension. Accordingly, we conducted a factor analysis and replicated our main models using it as a DV. First, we tested whether factor analysis is appropriate. Figure A-14 shows a correlation plot of the five variables (where costs have been inverted so that 0 is high agreement with the policy will be too costly and 100 is low agreement that the policy will be too costly). Notably, all variables *except* costliness correlate highly. Further evidence that a factor analysis is appropriate can be found in the fact that the determinant of the correlation matrix is

positive. And a Bartlett test confirms that the correlation matrix is factorable. As Figure A-15 shows, a scree plot confirms that we should extract a single factor from the data.

Accordingly, we conducted the factor analysis specifying a single factor, and extracted factor scores to use as a dependent variable. The cost variable dropped from the analysis, as expected given Figure A-14. The factor scores have a mean have of 0 and standard deviation of 0.95.<sup>1</sup> The following plots replicate our main models, presenting results using this factor score as the DV. The results of Figures A-16, A-17, and A-18 look similar to our main models. Once again, there is a strong underlying preference for sanctions. Also, preexisting affinity again is statistically significant in the expected directions.

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<sup>1</sup>Their distribution is slightly left-skewed, as the minimum (-2.6) is more extreme than the maximum (1.7). The median is 0.09






Figure A-14: Correlation plot

### Parallel Analysis Scree Plots




Figure A-15: Scree plot




Figure A-16: Effects with 95% confidence intervals, H1, H4-H6; DV = factor score




Figure A-17: Average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals, H2 & H3; DV = factor score




Figure A-18: Marginal means with 95% confidence intervals, H2 & H3; DV = factor score

## 4 Model with 5-category preexisting country attitudes

Figure A-19 replicates Figure 4 in the main text except that the preexisting attitude variable is included as a five-category variable (“very unfavorable,” “somewhat unfavorable,” “neutral,” “somewhat favorable,” “very favorable”) rather than aggregated into three categories. We aggregated in the main text because very few respondents chose either “favorable” option. However, we find that results look quite similar when using five categories.

We find that respondents who report a “very unfavorable” impression of the target are approximately 20 percentage points more supportive of sanctions than inducements. Conversely, respondents who report a “very favorable” impression of the target are 6.8 percentage points more supportive of inducements relative to sanctions. Unsurprisingly, these effects are stronger in magnitude than those presented in the main text when combining “very” and “somewhat” favorable and unfavorable.




Figure A-19: Average marginal component effects with 95% confidence intervals, H2 & H3, using 5-category priors

## 5 Results with expanded time horizons variables

We preregistered auxiliary hypotheses that combine treatments in order to more fully address potentially differing time horizons for the illiberal behavior in which targets engage as well as the potential speed with which US foreign policy might change such behavior. These hypotheses are:

*H7: Support for inducements compared to sanctions will be higher in the case where the foreign country's behavior seems most stable (a long history of bad behavior AND a likelihood that inaction would lead to a continuation of the current behavior)*

*H7A: Support for inducements compared to sanctions will be higher in the case that a long-term solution is suggested to a long-term problem (a long history of bad behavior AND the policy impact is expected to occur over time leading eventually to major changes)*

*H8: Support for sanctions compared to inducements will be higher in the case where the foreign country's behavior seems most unstable (a recent change in policy worsening bad behavior AND a likelihood that inaction would lead to a major crisis)*

*H8A: Support for sanctions compared to inducements will be higher when a short-term solution is proposed for a recent problem (a recent change in policy worsening bad behavior AND the policy impact is expected to occur immediately leading quickly to minor changes)*

To test these hypotheses, we coded two new variables. First, "Horizon" has the following three categories: "Long" if the background is long-enduring and continuation of the same is expected if no action is taken; "Short" if the background is a recent shift and the situation is a ticking clock towards disaster; and "Baseline" if neither of these other two continues exist. Second, "Effect" has the similar categories: "Long" if the background is long-enduring and the policy would have a long-term impact; "Short" if the background is a recent shift and the policy would have an immediate impact; and "Baseline" if neither of the other conditions applies.

Results from Figure A-20 show that we do not find support for Hypotheses 7 or 8. For the Horizon variable, neither "Short" nor "Long" is statistically significant with respect to the relative preference for sanctions relative to inducements. One notable finding is that the "Short" Effect variable (indicating a recent shift in behavior and an anticipated quick impact of the policy) leads to higher relative support for sanctions over inducements of 14.2, while the "Long" Effect realization is associated with a higher relative support for sanctions equal to 11.3.






Figure A-20: Replication model considering conditionality by history and prospects if no action taken

## 6 Subset models

### 6.1 Results subset by bad behavior

Next, we present Figure A-21, a replication of Figure 5 subset by issue. Results suggest that support for our expectations regarding proposal authors is specific to the issue of terrorism, where respondents are less favorable towards policy proposals authored by non-experts and political appointees, relative to policies authored by professionals with issue expertise.




Figure A-21: Replication model considering conditionality by issue (Marginal means)

## 6.2 Results subset by experiment

Next, we present a series of results broken down by the three experiments we conducted. In our main models, we present these in combined form as they can be considered a single, constrained conjoint design. However, disaggregating allows us to examine whether results are consistent when using different issues; and while taking more space, disaggregating results in unconstrained conjoint designs such that we can calculate differences in AMCEs across policy treatments.

First, Figure A-22, a replication of the left side plot of Figure 3 subset by experiment. Once again, we see significant results for policy authors only in experiment 2, which includes the issues of democracy backsliding and state support for terrorism.




Figure A-22: Replication model considering conditionality by experiment (AMCEs)

Next, we present Figures A-23 and A-24, which presents AMCEs and marginal means, respectively, differenced by policy—solely for experiment 1. Figures A-25 and A-26 presents AMCEs and marginal means, respectively, differenced by policy for experiment 2. And Figures A-27 and A-28 presents AMCEs and marginal means, respectively, differenced by policy for experiment 3. Results generally look similar across each of the three experiments.




Figure A-23: AMCEs (and differences) for experiment 1




Figure A-24: Marginal means (and differences) for experiment 1




Figure A-25: AMCEs (and differences) for experiment 2




Figure A-26: Marginal means (and differences) for experiment 2




Figure A-27: AMCEs (and differences) for experiment 3






Figure A-28: Marginal means (and differences) for experiment 3

### 6.3 Results subset by respondent party ID

Next we use demographic data collected by Lucid to replicate Figures 3 and 5 for subsets of observations disaggregated by party ID. In Figure A-29, we find that some of our results are conditional on party. Only Republicans support policies more when the issues are more security-based, and when they are informed of a ticking clock—something that we expected to be true for all respondents. Conversely, only Democratic identifiers support the policy less when informed that the author is an appointee who donated to the president’s campaign compared to a career professional with expertise.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>This Democrat-specific finding occurred during the Biden administration, as the experiment was conducted in April 2021.




Figure A-29: Replication model considering conditionality party ID (AMCEs)




Figure A-30: Replication model considering conditionality party ID (marginal means)

## 6.4 Results subset by gender

Next we use demographic data collected by Lucid to replicate Figures 3 and 5 for subsets of observations disaggregated by gender. Here we find an interesting result that men prefer sanctions more while women prefer inducements more, though substantive effects are modest.




Figure A-31: Replication model considering conditionality by gender (AMCES)




Figure A-32: Replication model considering conditionality by gender (marginal means)

### 6.5 Results subset by target country

Next, we present Figure A-33, which replicates Figure 3 for each target country. Results generally are consistent across these subsets of observations.




Figure A-33: Replication model considering conditionality by target country (AMCEs)

## 6.6 Results subset by preexisting favorability towards target

Results in subsamples of observations disaggregated by preexisting respondent attitudes towards the target complement our main findings. One notable finding in Figure [A-34](#) is that sanctions are slightly preferred to inducements among respondents who report a “neutral” attitude towards the target. We also disaggregated results for the five-category version of preexisting attitudes (Figure [A-35](#)), finding similar results.




Figure A-34: Replication model considering conditionality by preexisting attitudes (marginal means)






Figure A-35: Replication model considering conditionality by preexisting attitudes (marginal means)

## 7 Results considering multiple subsets of conditions

Given that we have almost 7300 observations across our three experiments, we are able to further disaggregate groups, as shown below.

## 7.1 Policy and party




Figure A-36: Replication model considering conditionality by policy and party (AMCEs)

## 7.2 Policy and issue




Figure A-37: Replication model considering conditionality by policy and issue (AMCEs)

### 7.3 Policy and country




Figure A-38: Replication model considering conditionality by policy and country (AMCEs)

## 8 Exact language of attribute values

Table 1 in the main text presents the attributes (primary and secondary) in our experiments. To save space, we place the exact wording for some of the attributes here in the appendix.

Regarding the policy proposal: 1) “Financial inducements facilitating investment in [Country],” or 2) “Financial sanctions prohibiting certain international payments to and from [Country].”

Regarding the US rationale: 1) “This will have an immediate [positive; negative] impact on the economy of [Country], [encouraging; pressuring] leaders to [change behavior quickly],” or 2) “This will have an enduring [positive; negative] impact on the economy of [Country], [encouraging; pressuring] leaders to [change behavior over time].”

Regarding the proposal author: 1) “The author of the proposal is a long-term career professional in the US foreign service,” 2) “The author of the proposal is a long-term career professional in the US foreign service with expertise on [Country],” 3) “The author of the proposal is a political appointee,” or 4) “The author of the proposal is a political appointee who was a presidential campaign donor.”

Regarding consequences of inaction: 1) “Without action, conditions in [Country] are likely to continue,” or 2) “Without action, [ticking clock scenario] by [Country] is likely in the near future.”  
Regarding the economic impact: “[random draw from uniform distribution between 50-900] million in economic [benefits; costs] to [Country].”

## 9 Descriptive statistics and demographic balance across treatments

Finally, we present summary statistics and evidence of demographic balance across our main treatments. We also graph the distribution of preexisting attitudes towards target states, both for our aggregated, 3-category variable and the raw, 5-category version.

Characteristic	N = 7,287 <sup>1</sup>
<b>party3</b>	
Democrat	3,576 (49%)
Independent/Other	1,157 (16%)
Republican	2,554 (35%)
<b>gender</b>	
Female	3,699 (51%)
Male	3,588 (49%)
<b>Black</b>	
Black resp.	824 (11%)
Non-Black resp.	6,463 (89%)
<b>Hispanic</b>	
Hispanic resp.	839 (12%)
Non-Hispanic resp.	6,448 (88%)
<b>edcat</b>	
Some HS or less	169 (2.3%)
Bachelors degree	1,861 (26%)
Graduate degree	1,563 (21%)
HS grad	1,205 (17%)
None of above	45 (0.6%)
Post-HS up to Associates	2,444 (34%)
<b>agecat</b>	
Under 30	1,562 (21%)
30-49	2,690 (37%)
50-65	1,933 (27%)
66 or older	1,102 (15%)
<b>urban_rural</b>	
Rural	1,659 (23%)
Suburban	3,304 (45%)
Urban	2,323 (32%)
Unknown	1

Table A-1: Sample summary stats

<sup>1</sup> n (%)

Characteristic	Inducements, N = 3,633 <sup>1</sup>	Sanctions, N = 3,654 <sup>1</sup>	p-value <sup>2</sup>
<b>party3</b>			0.4
Democrat	1,754 (48%)	1,822 (50%)	
Independent/Other	589 (16%)	568 (16%)	
Republican	1,290 (36%)	1,264 (35%)	
<b>gender</b>			0.7
Female	1,837 (51%)	1,862 (51%)	
Male	1,796 (49%)	1,792 (49%)	
<b>Black</b>			>0.9
Black resp.	410 (11%)	414 (11%)	
Non-Black resp.	3,223 (89%)	3,240 (89%)	
<b>Hispanic</b>			0.2
Hispanic resp.	436 (12%)	403 (11%)	
Non-Hispanic resp.	3,197 (88%)	3,251 (89%)	
<b>edcat</b>			0.8
Some HS or less	83 (2.3%)	86 (2.4%)	
Bachelors degree	911 (25%)	950 (26%)	
Graduate degree	784 (22%)	779 (21%)	
HS grad	621 (17%)	584 (16%)	
None of above	21 (0.6%)	24 (0.7%)	
Post-HS up to Associates	1,213 (33%)	1,231 (34%)	
<b>agecat</b>			0.7
Under 30	765 (21%)	797 (22%)	
30-49	1,334 (37%)	1,356 (37%)	
50-65	970 (27%)	963 (26%)	
66 or older	564 (16%)	538 (15%)	
<b>urban_rural</b>			0.2
Rural	845 (23%)	814 (22%)	
Suburban	1,666 (46%)	1,638 (45%)	
Urban	1,122 (31%)	1,201 (33%)	
Unknown	0	1	

Table A-2: Sample balance by policy

<sup>1</sup>n (%)

<sup>2</sup>Pearson's Chi-squared test



Characteristic	LongHistory, N = 3,652 <sup>1</sup>	RecentShift, N = 3,635 <sup>1</sup>	p-value <sup>2</sup>
<b>party3</b>			0.8
Democrat	1,801 (49%)	1,775 (49%)	
Independent/Other	584 (16%)	573 (16%)	
Republican	1,267 (35%)	1,287 (35%)	
<b>gender</b>			0.8
Female	1,858 (51%)	1,841 (51%)	
Male	1,794 (49%)	1,794 (49%)	
<b>Black</b>			0.6
Black resp.	405 (11%)	419 (12%)	
Non-Black resp.	3,247 (89%)	3,216 (88%)	
<b>Hispanic</b>			0.8
Hispanic resp.	424 (12%)	415 (11%)	
Non-Hispanic resp.	3,228 (88%)	3,220 (89%)	
<b>edcat</b>			0.3
Some HS or less	87 (2.4%)	82 (2.3%)	
Bachelors degree	952 (26%)	909 (25%)	
Graduate degree	762 (21%)	801 (22%)	
HS grad	589 (16%)	616 (17%)	
None of above	17 (0.5%)	28 (0.8%)	
Post-HS up to Associates	1,245 (34%)	1,199 (33%)	
<b>agecat</b>			0.5
Under 30	770 (21%)	792 (22%)	
30-49	1,338 (37%)	1,352 (37%)	
50-65	969 (27%)	964 (27%)	
66 or older	575 (16%)	527 (14%)	
<b>urban_rural</b>			0.043
Rural	819 (22%)	840 (23%)	
Suburban	1,708 (47%)	1,596 (44%)	
Urban	1,125 (31%)	1,198 (33%)	
Unknown	0	1	

Table A-3: Sample balance by background

<sup>1</sup>n (%)

<sup>2</sup>Pearson's Chi-squared test

Characteristic	stopdemocracy, N = 3,619 <sup>1</sup>	developnukes, N = 1,212 <sup>1</sup>	drugs, N = 1,235 <sup>1</sup>	terror, N = 1,221 <sup>1</sup>	p-value <sup>2</sup>
<b>party3</b>					0.7
Democrat	1,774 (49%)	610 (50%)	606 (49%)	586 (48%)	
Independent/Other	578 (16%)	202 (17%)	191 (15%)	186 (15%)	
Republican	1,267 (35%)	400 (33%)	438 (35%)	449 (37%)	
<b>gender</b>					0.5
Female	1,859 (51%)	624 (51%)	612 (50%)	604 (49%)	
Male	1,760 (49%)	588 (49%)	623 (50%)	617 (51%)	
<b>Black</b>					0.3
Black resp.	386 (11%)	154 (13%)	142 (11%)	142 (12%)	
Non-Black resp.	3,233 (89%)	1,058 (87%)	1,093 (89%)	1,079 (88%)	
<b>Hispanic</b>					0.4
Hispanic resp.	423 (12%)	151 (12%)	127 (10%)	138 (11%)	
Non-Hispanic resp.	3,196 (88%)	1,061 (88%)	1,108 (90%)	1,083 (89%)	
<b>edcat</b>					0.14
Some HS or less	93 (2.6%)	35 (2.9%)	18 (1.5%)	23 (1.9%)	
Bachelors degree	944 (26%)	288 (24%)	321 (26%)	308 (25%)	
Graduate degree	755 (21%)	243 (20%)	282 (23%)	283 (23%)	
HS grad	597 (16%)	200 (17%)	219 (18%)	189 (15%)	
None of above	22 (0.6%)	7 (0.6%)	9 (0.7%)	7 (0.6%)	
Post-HS up to Associates	1,208 (33%)	439 (36%)	386 (31%)	411 (34%)	
<b>agecat</b>					0.11
Under 30	788 (22%)	287 (24%)	236 (19%)	251 (21%)	
30-49	1,358 (38%)	418 (34%)	464 (38%)	450 (37%)	
50-65	958 (26%)	312 (26%)	344 (28%)	319 (26%)	
66 or older	515 (14%)	195 (16%)	191 (15%)	201 (16%)	
<b>urban_rural</b>					>0.9
Rural	809 (22%)	284 (23%)	281 (23%)	285 (23%)	
Suburban	1,646 (45%)	546 (45%)	564 (46%)	548 (45%)	
Urban	1,163 (32%)	382 (32%)	390 (32%)	388 (32%)	
Unknown	1	0	0	0	

Table A-4: Sample balance by bad behavior

<sup>1</sup> n (%)

<sup>2</sup> Pearson's Chi-squared test

Characteristic	Continue, N = 3,694 <sup>1</sup>	TickingClock, N = 3,593 <sup>1</sup>	p-value <sup>2</sup>
<b>party3</b>			0.2
Democrat	1,782 (48%)	1,794 (50%)	
Independent/Other	582 (16%)	575 (16%)	
Republican	1,330 (36%)	1,224 (34%)	
<b>gender</b>			0.5
Female	1,861 (50%)	1,838 (51%)	
Male	1,833 (50%)	1,755 (49%)	
<b>Black</b>			>0.9
Black resp.	417 (11%)	407 (11%)	
Non-Black resp.	3,277 (89%)	3,186 (89%)	
<b>Hispanic</b>			0.4
Hispanic resp.	436 (12%)	403 (11%)	
Non-Hispanic resp.	3,258 (88%)	3,190 (89%)	
<b>edcat</b>			0.8
Some HS or less	81 (2.2%)	88 (2.4%)	
Bachelors degree	931 (25%)	930 (26%)	
Graduate degree	808 (22%)	755 (21%)	
HS grad	624 (17%)	581 (16%)	
None of above	21 (0.6%)	24 (0.7%)	
Post-HS up to Associates	1,229 (33%)	1,215 (34%)	
<b>agecat</b>			0.055
Under 30	804 (22%)	758 (21%)	
30-49	1,357 (37%)	1,333 (37%)	
50-65	941 (25%)	992 (28%)	
66 or older	592 (16%)	510 (14%)	
<b>urban_rural</b>			0.8
Rural	844 (23%)	815 (23%)	
Suburban	1,687 (46%)	1,617 (45%)	
Urban	1,163 (31%)	1,160 (32%)	
Unknown	0	1	

Table A-5: Sample balance by ticking clock

<sup>1</sup>n (%)

<sup>2</sup>Pearson's Chi-squared test

Characteristic	Professional_expert, N = 1,777 <sup>1</sup>	Professional, N = 1,844 <sup>1</sup>	Appointee_only, N = 1,779 <sup>1</sup>	Appointee_donor, N = 1,887 <sup>1</sup>	p-value <sup>2</sup>
<b>party3</b>					0.5
Democrat	879 (49%)	920 (50%)	856 (48%)	921 (49%)	
Independent/Other	256 (14%)	293 (16%)	294 (17%)	314 (17%)	
Republican	642 (36%)	631 (34%)	629 (35%)	652 (35%)	
<b>gender</b>					0.7
Female	923 (52%)	937 (51%)	890 (50%)	949 (50%)	
Male	854 (48%)	907 (49%)	889 (50%)	938 (50%)	
<b>Black</b>					0.7
Black resp.	213 (12%)	212 (11%)	193 (11%)	206 (11%)	
Non-Black resp.	1,564 (88%)	1,632 (89%)	1,586 (89%)	1,681 (89%)	
<b>Hispanic</b>					>0.9
Hispanic resp.	204 (11%)	219 (12%)	206 (12%)	210 (11%)	
Non-Hispanic resp.	1,573 (89%)	1,625 (88%)	1,573 (88%)	1,677 (89%)	
<b>edcat</b>					0.5
Some HS or less	43 (2.4%)	52 (2.8%)	37 (2.1%)	37 (2.0%)	
Bachelors degree	471 (27%)	467 (25%)	438 (25%)	485 (26%)	
Graduate degree	398 (22%)	403 (22%)	371 (21%)	391 (21%)	
HS grad	260 (15%)	298 (16%)	313 (18%)	334 (18%)	
None of above	9 (0.5%)	12 (0.7%)	10 (0.6%)	14 (0.7%)	
Post-HS up to Associates	596 (34%)	612 (33%)	610 (34%)	626 (33%)	
<b>agecat</b>					0.10
Under 30	383 (22%)	402 (22%)	366 (21%)	411 (22%)	
30-49	622 (35%)	736 (40%)	651 (37%)	681 (36%)	
50-65	487 (27%)	450 (24%)	489 (27%)	507 (27%)	
66 or older	285 (16%)	256 (14%)	273 (15%)	288 (15%)	
<b>urban_rural</b>					0.2
Rural	369 (21%)	415 (23%)	414 (23%)	461 (24%)	
Suburban	827 (47%)	849 (46%)	782 (44%)	846 (45%)	
Urban	581 (33%)	580 (31%)	582 (33%)	580 (31%)	
Unknown	0	0	1	0	

Table A-6: Sample balance by policy author

<sup>1</sup> n (%)<sup>2</sup> Pearson's Chi-squared test




Figure A-39: Distributions of preexisting attitudes by country




Figure A-40: Distributions of preexisting attitudes by country, 5-category version

## 10 Preregistration materials

Our anonymized preregistration materials can be found [here](#). Note that we re-ordered some of our hypotheses to improve manuscript flow.